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Abstract:  
Federal Sentencing Disparity, 2005-2012, examines patterns of federal sentencing disparity among white and 
black offenders, by sentence received, and looks at judicial variation in sentencing since Booker vs. United 
States, regardless of race. It summarizes U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, discusses how approaches of other 
researchers to the study of sentencing practices differ from this approach, defines disparity as used in this 
study, and explains the methodology. This working paper was prepared by Abt Associates for BJS in response 
to a request by the Department of Justice’s Racial Disparities Working Group to design a study of federal 
sentencing disparity. Data are from BJS’s Federal Justice Statistics Program, which annually collects federal 
criminal justice processing data from various federal agencies. The analysis uses data mainly from the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission. 
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Introduction 
As part of a cooperative agreement for the Federal Justice Statistics Program (FJSP), the Bureau of 
Justice Statistics (BJS) instructed Abt Associates to design a study of federal sentencing disparity, as requested 
by the U.S. Department of Justice’s Racial Disparities Working Group. This report responds to those 
instructions by presenting a new methodology for studying sentencing disparity. Although this report is 
principally a discussion of methods, findings are also discussed. For the purposes of this study, the broad 
research question is— 
• Do non-Hispanic African American or black (hereafter black) offenders receive prison terms that are 
longer on average than the prison terms received by non-Hispanic white (hereafter white) offenders, 
accounting for the apparent facts surrounding the crime and the offender’s criminal record? We call 
observed differences disparity, although based on the evidence we cannot attribute disparate 
decision-making to racial bias. 
The principal research question concerns the sentencing disparity between white and black offenders. 
However, using the above measure of disparity, the broad research question is divided into the following 
specific questions: 
1. Did the degree of disparity change between 2005 and 2012? As explained later in this report, the 
years are important because a 2005 Supreme Court decision (Booker v. United States) (hereafter 
Booker) rendered the Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory.  
2. Did the degree of disparity change with the seriousness of the offense and the offender’s criminal 
history?  
3. To what extent was the disparity systematic and to what extent was it specific to individual judges?  
4. Between 2005 and 2012, a period in which the guidelines were advisory rather than mandatory, did 
judges increasingly disagree about the appropriate sentences for offenders? 
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The first two questions pertain directly to patterns regarding the differences in sentences received by 
white and black offenders. The third and fourth questions pertain to judicial disagreement about sentences 
without regard to race. Several recent studies have examined how the Booker decision affected disparity by 
giving judges increased latitude to impose sentences. Our study, which uses post-Booker data exclusively, 
does not purport to examine the impact of Booker.1 
Data for this study come from the FJSP, sponsored by BJS, which annually assembles federal criminal 
justice processing data from various federal agencies. The analyses rests heavily on data from the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission (USSC) because those data are the richest source of offense and offender 
information, as the USSC is the principal source of data for sentencing. However, this study draws on other 
parts of the FJSP for judicial identity. The data used in this study and the study itself do not identify specific 
judges by name. 
                                                          
1 Program evaluators recognize that assessing the impact of Booker is an application of program evaluation, which 
is complicated and uncertain outside of randomized experimentation because causation is difficult to establish. At 
the least, a study of Booker’s impact would require the use of pre- and post-Booker sentencing data, but the study 
reported here uses post-Booker data only. Even if it included pre-Booker data, attributing chances to Booker would 
raise validity challenges. The methodology discussed in the study reported here does not deal with methods that 
might be used to overcome those validity challenges. 
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1.0 Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines are a set of rules and policy statements for federal judges to use 
when imposing sentences. (See appendix A for more information.) At the time of sentencing, a judge 
considers the facts surrounding the case along with the offender’s criminal history and his or her 
cooperation with the government and then assigns the offender to a cell in a two-dimensional 43x6 
sentencing grid. The grid’s vertical axis corresponds to the facts surrounding the case (e.g., brandishing a 
weapon during a bank robbery). The grid’s horizontal axis corresponds to the offender’s criminal history 
(e.g., the offender previously served a prison term in excess of 1 year). If the offender cooperated with 
the government, the sentencing judge can move the offender from one cell to another, according to 
prescribed rules. 
The guideline cell stipulates a recommended sentence based on the facts surrounding the case 
(e.g., the charge, use of a weapon, and amount of drugs involved), the offender’s criminal record, and 
the offender’s cooperation with the government. Some of the cells allow for probation sentences and 
some allow for a combination of probation and prison. All of the cells identify a lower and upper limit for 
any recommended prison term, each with no more than a 25% difference between the lower and upper 
limit (excluding cells recommending the shortest sentences). 
When promulgated in 1987, the guidelines were mandatory and judges were expected to sentence 
within the lower and upper limits, although they could depart from the guidelines with written 
justification subject to appellate review. Since 2005, the guidelines have been advisory and the scope of 
appellate review is limited. Although our study examines the current application of the guidelines, a 
historical perspective is helpful for defining current: 
•  Mandatory guidelines went into effect for most criminal cases in 1987. The guidelines have 
been revised at the USSC’s discretion, subject to Senate approval. 
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• In 1996, Koon v. United States (hereafter Koon) clarified the role of appellate court review. 
Deference was paid to fact findings at the district court level; i.e., an appellate court had to 
accept the facts determined by the sentencing judge. This meant that review was limited to 
mechanical errors in applying the guidelines and the legitimacy of reasons for departure. 
• In 2003, Congress passed the PROTECT Act (hereafter PROTECT), which required justification for 
departures, thereby reducing judicial latitude to depart from the guidelines. In exchange for 
cooperation with the government, the Commission strengthened the guidelines consistent with 
PROTECT and formalized some provisions for reducing sentences. Congress specified that higher 
court review would be de novo, meaning that circuit courts no longer had to defer to lower 
court findings of fact. As a result, Koon was nullified. 
• In 2005 Booker v. United States (hereafter Booker), the Supreme Court ruled that the guidelines 
were advisory rather than mandatory and reestablished the level of deference to findings of fact 
consistent with Koon. The PROTECT Act retained the features that reward cooperation with the 
government. 
• In 2007, the Supreme Court ruled in Gall v. United States (hereafter Gall) that the federal 
appeals courts may not presume that a sentence falling outside the range recommended by the 
guidelines is unreasonable. This decision strengthened the authority of district court judges to 
depart from the guidelines. 
The USSC identifies four periods in the evolution of the guidelines (Commission, 2012). Ignoring pre-
Koon, the periods are Koon to PROTECT, PROTECT to Booker, Booker to Gall, and post-Gall. The 
Commission’s report shows how disparity has changed over these four periods. However, BJS is 
concerned with disparity under current sentencing laws. Our analysis is focused on post-Booker 
sentencing, meaning that we examine sentences imposed during the last two periods. 
 5 
Federal Sentencing Disparity, 2005–2012  
In Gall, the Supreme Court specified the procedure for post-Booker sentencing. Although the 
guidelines are advisory, a sentencing judge must compute and consider the guideline range and the 
Commission’s policy statements. Thus, although the guidelines are currently advisory, they are not 
irrelevant. An empirical study can still treat the elements entering into guideline computations (as 
reported by the Commission) as representing the facts surrounding the case and the offender’s criminal 
history as established by a preponderance of the evidence (i.e., the evidentiary standard for application 
of the guidelines).2 For our purposes, this means that we can consider the guideline cell as the starting 
point for studying disparity under the guidelines. This is extremely important because otherwise we 
would be unable to distinguish between variation in sentences that are attributed to facts surrounding 
the case or criminal record and systematic unwarranted variation. 
The judge must consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) taken as a whole.3 There are 
disagreements in circuits and among legal scholars regarding when courts may disregard commission 
policy—and even congressional policy—and the permissible grounds for doing so have not been 
resolved. Further, the courts are divided on two important questions: “How much weight should be 
given to guidelines resulting from congressional directives to the Commission?” and “What is the 
appropriate interaction between the proscriptions and limitations on consideration of offender 
characteristics in section 994 of Title 28 and the courts’ consideration of offender characteristics in 
section 3553(a)?”4 Booker has given judges substantial discretion, reinforced by Gall, to impose 
sentences using subjective decisions about the adequacy of the sentences recommended by the Federal 
                                                          
2 Chapter 6 § 6A1.3 specifies the evidentiary rules: “In resolving any dispute regarding a factor important to the 
sentencing determination, the court may consider relevant information without regard to its admissibility under 
the rules of evidence applicable at trial, provided the information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its 
probable accuracy.” 
3 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) states the purposes of sentencing, states the role of the guidelines when imposing a sentence, 
and provides justification for sentencing below mandatory minimums and for rewarding offender assistance to the 
government. 
4 28 U.S. Code § 994 prescribes duties of the USSC.  
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Sentencing Guidelines. This observation is important because it provides motivation for studying how 
that discretion is being exercised and whether sentencing disparity is associated with that judicial 
discretion. 
A principal difficulty when studying disparity is that the facts surrounding the case cannot be 
known with certainty. Assistant U.S. Attorneys and defense council may manipulate facts to bind the 
judge or to avoid mandatory minimum sentences (Commission, 2011). Even when the facts surrounding 
the case accurately reflect offense behavior and consequences, the judge may observe additional facts 
(relevant for sentencing) that do not appear in the guidelines and, as a result, do not appear in our data. 
Fact manipulation and data limitations raise difficult problems with interpretation, which are addressed 
later in this report. (See section 5.3.) 
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2.0 Recent Studies of Sentencing Disparity 
Many researchers have examined disparity under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, but fewer 
researchers have focused their attention on the post-Booker era. We limit this review to selected studies 
that examine post-Booker federal sentencing.  
All analyses of sentencing disparity are predicated on a normative position that similarly 
situated offenders who have been convicted of similar crimes should receive similar sentences. The 
exact meaning of this normative position is debatable, but it seems as though most people would agree 
that black and white offenders, convicted of the same crime under the same conditions, should receive 
equivalent sentences. Researchers examining the post-Booker era have taken two approaches to testing 
the null hypothesis of sentencing equality. 
One approach has been to start with the facts surrounding the case as relevant to application of 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and to determine whether whites and blacks receive comparable 
sentences. Several studies (Motivans & Snyder, 2009; Ulmer, Light, & Kramer, 2011; Commission, 2012) 
follow this approach. An alternative approach is to start with the facts surrounding the case at the time 
of prosecution, with the assertion that prosecutors manipulate facts before they are considered for 
guideline application and determine whether offenders accused of the same crime receive the same 
treatment. Other works (Starr & Rehavi, 2013; Rehavi & Starr, 2013; Fishman & Schanzenback, 2012; 
Yang, 2014) are consistent with this alternative approach. These two lines of inquiry answer different 
research questions, although both are framed as studies of sentencing disparity. This section 
summarizes these studies and compares the current study’s approach with extant studies.  
Consistent with its role in the federal justice system, the USSC frequently studies federal 
sentencing patterns. Its Report on the Continuing Impact of United States v. Booker on Federal 
Sentencing (2012) is a comprehensive assessment of how the Booker decision affected the application of 
federal sentences. Much of that assessment is tabulation and graphical representation; the descriptive 
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nature of the analysis appropriately tells a story suitable for the Commission’s audience. Part of the 
Commission’s assessment also includes an empirical analysis that is multivariate and inferential, and is 
similar to the methods presented in our study. 
To assess racial disparity at the time of sentencing, the Commission used an ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression model, with the length of the prison term as the dependent variable, the 
minimum recommended sentence range as the principal covariates, and race and sex as multiplicative 
factors.5 The Commission concluded that “…unwarranted disparities in federal sentencing appear to be 
increasing” (Commission, 2012, p. 3). Summarizing its findings: 
“The Commission’s updated multivariate regression analysis showed, among other outcomes, 
that black male offenders have continued to receive longer sentences than similarly situated 
white male offenders.... In addition, female offenders have received shorter sentences than 
similarly situated male offenders.” (Commission, 2012, p. 9) 
As with the analysis reported in our study, the Commission used the recommended sentence in the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines as the starting point for an analysis, asking how sentences for blacks 
differed systematically from sentences for whites. Regarding salient differences between our study and 
the Commission’s study, the Commission used a pre- and post-Booker selection of data, given its 
concern with the impact of Booker, while our analysis is concerned only with post-Booker trends. The 
Commission used what we view as strong assumptions about the underlying sentencing decisions of the 
structural model, while we have used a structural model that is more flexible. The Commission used an 
OLS regression model; our approach uses a linear random effects regression model. Our principal 
analysis excludes noncitizens while the Commission included noncitizens, and our analysis makes a 
                                                          
5 The Commission used OLS to regress the logarithm of time served on the logarithm of the minimum sentence and 
a linear combination of variables, including race. This is equivalent to assuming that the race variable has a 
multiplicative effect on the sentence imposed. The specification is cumbersome because sentences and guideline 
minimums are frequently zero and the logarithm of zero is undefined. The Commission set the logarithm of zero to 
a small positive number. 
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somewhat different selection of offenses than was made by the Commission. (This report provides a 
separate analysis of the sentencing of noncitizens.)  
Motivans and Snyder (2009) analyzed USSC data for fiscal years 1994 through 2008. Their results 
show that blacks receive mean prison terms that are, in general, longer than whites, and are longer than 
whites after adjusting for offense seriousness and criminal history, both together and separately. Much 
of that disparity disappeared once a regression was used to control for departure type,6 offense type, 
and whether there was a weapons charge. 
Motivans and Snyder (2009) examined sentences for whites and blacks within each guideline 
cell and then averaged over guideline cells. Their approach to estimating differences within guideline 
cells and then summarizing over the cells is in the spirit of the approach taken in our study. However, we 
adopted a regression model that provides a systematic summary of variation in disparity across the cells 
and over time that often uses stratification instead of covariates and leads to standard statistical testing. 
Ulmer, Light, and Kramer (2011) wrote another study as a critique of a 2010 commission report 
(the predecessor of the report cited above). They examined a period that started well before 2005 
through fiscal year 2009. Their findings proved sensitive to the short post-Booker period (Commission, 
2012, pp. 11, part E); based on a reanalysis reported by the Commission (Commission, 2012, pp. 11, part 
E), revised Ulmer, Light, and Kramer findings for the post-Booker period are similar to those reported in 
the Commission’s study. An anonymous reviewer of an earlier draft of this BJS study reports replicating 
the Ulmer, Light, and Kramer approach using data extended through 2012. The reviewer found that 
disparity increases initially and then stops increasing. This BJS study will report similar findings. Ulmer, 
Light, and Kramer made decisions about excluding some cases that are consistent with our decisions, 
and they made decisions about including or not including covariates that are inconsistent with our 
                                                          
6 There are many reasons for departures. The most important reasons when studying sentencing disparity are 
departures attributable to the initiative of the assistant U.S. Attorney and departures attributable to judicial 
sentencing discretion. 
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decisions. They used an estimation procedure (a two-step estimator) with which we disagree,7 but we 
still find their results informative and credible. 
Starr and Rehavi (2013) are critical of the above tradition that treats the guideline 
recommendations as the starting point for analysis; while they provide a methodological critique, their 
harshest criticism is that the above researchers are asking the wrong research question. 8 Ulmer, Light, 
and Kramer were concerned with disparity, conditional on the facts surrounding the case as determined 
at the time of guideline administration. Starr and Rehavi opine that the correct concern is with disparity, 
conditional on the original offense. They dismiss answers to the first question because apparent 
disparity at the sentencing stage may merely reflect charging and bargaining decisions by prosecutors.   
Another recent study (Johnson, 2014) expands on this line of inquiry by examining racial 
disparities and prosecutorial decision-making in the context of a federal prosecutor’s decision to decline 
prosecution and his or her decision to prosecute an offender under a lesser charge than the arresting 
charge. Johnson’s work uses both fixed and random effects (logit) estimation to study a cohort of 
federal arrestees from 2003 to 2005, and finds at least some evidence to support the argument that 
racial disparities exist in prosecutorial decision-making—although disparities tend to favor blacks, not 
whites. It is difficult to conclude from this study whether Johnson’s findings ultimately support or refute 
the argument by Starr and Rehavi that disparate sentences are a reaction by judges to bargaining 
decisions by prosecutors. On the one hand, Johnson demonstrates that charge reductions result in 
                                                          
7 The approach to two-step models is complicated (Rhodes, 2014). We do not object to estimating the first-stage 
equation of whether the judge imposes a prison term, which is a principal part of the Ulmer, Light, and Kramer 
study. However, consistency of the parameters in the second-stage equation depends on strong assumptions 
regarding independence of the first-stage and second-stage decision or else instrumental variables. When 
independence does not hold, estimated parameters will be biased estimates of their population counterparts. 
Ulmer, Light, and Kramer carefully attempted to counter these problems, but there is no good solution. An 
alternative approach is to use a generalized linear model to estimate the conditional mean instead of underlying 
parameters. 
8 We are concerned with the Starr and Rehavi methodology, much of which is described in a second paper (Rehavi 
& Starr, 2012). We are not convinced that the initial charge is a good starting point for a disparity study. Our 
investigation shows that the charges registered by the U.S. Marshals Service are very broad and not good 
descriptions of underlying offense conduct. Also see Rehavi and Starr (2013).  
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materially lower sentence lengths, but this decrease is not as large as it should have been given the 
decrease in the presumptive sentence that results from moving to a new guideline cell (Johnson, 2014, 
p. 74, table 9). On the other hand, Johnson shows that, even after controlling for the presence of charge 
reduction and the associated presumptive sentence, blacks still receive significantly longer sentences 
(Johnson, 2014, p. 74, table 9). It is difficult to conclude how behavior ultimately affects sentencing 
disparities on average. However, Johnson’s work emphasizes the importance of considering 
prosecutorial practices in studying sentencing disparities. 
Fishman and Schanzenbach’s (2012) study is in the spirit of Starr and Rehavi’s (2013) study.9 It is 
straightforward, examining whether transitions from more to less restrictive guidelines (as a result of 
Supreme Court decisions) caused disparity to increase or decrease. They find that court decisions 
sometimes greatly alter the administration of justice (especially departures and sentencing at the 
statutory minimum), but our interpretation of their work is that the alteration in the administration of 
justice did not have a large impact on racial disparity. Yang (2013) takes a similar approach of basing 
inferences on short-term changes. After accounting for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion with 
regard to charging decision, Yang (2013, p. 2) finds evidence of a 4% increase in racial sentencing 
disparity post-Booker. Our study reports an increase of the same magnitude.10 
Our view is that both lines of inquiry pose valid research questions. We agree with Starr and 
Rehavi that it may be impossible to fully discount an explanation that other unobserved variables—
perhaps variables that can be attributed to prosecutorial discretion—account for estimated differences 
                                                          
9 Fishman and Schanzenbach introduce the terms endogenous and exogenous, although not necessarily in a way 
that we find helpful. Their argument might be summarized to say that prosecutors make charging and bargaining 
decisions that are endogenous because they take judicial responses into account. Nevertheless, we consider the 
charging and bargaining outcomes as being exogenous to the judge’s decision. 
10 Although Yang’s findings are similar to ours, there are large differences in methodology. Yang uses a regression 
model that imposes structural restrictions that are much more restrictive than those adopted for our study; 
includes noncitizens in the analysis while, for reasons explained later, we limit our analysis to citizens; and 
attempts to control for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, while we examine the exercise of discretion but do 
not build it into our statistical model. 
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in the sentences for white and black offenders. However, if we observe trends toward increasing or 
decreasing disparity during a period where those unobserved factors are presumably or demonstrably 
constant, then those trends provide strong evidence of disparity attributable to race.11  We can further 
strengthen the inferences by checking trends in other observed variables. Finding that there are no 
strong trends in observed variables, it seems reasonable to conclude that there are no strong trends in 
unobserved variables. Trend analysis plays an important role in the inferences drawn in our study. 
Figure 1 summarizes the arguments. Presumably there is a true set of facts regarding the 
offender and the offense, although offenders attempt to hide their criminal behaviors; as a result, the 
facts may be known imperfectly. The facts are filtered by an assistant U.S. Attorney, who decides what 
to charge and attempts to prove what he or she charges, bargains with defendants and defense 
attorneys, and ultimately presents his or her set of facts to the judge. A probation officer investigates 
the offense conduct according to police reports (e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation and Drug 
Enforcement Administration), learns about the offender’s criminal history, and studies the offender’s 
background (e.g., employment, and residential and marital status), and prepares and submits a 
presentence investigation report to the judge. Given the convicting charges and the facts surrounding 
the case, the judge imposes a sentence. 
                                                          
11 Although they are critical of the traditional sentencing guidelines, Starr and Reventi (2013, p. 40) recognize the 
advantage of studies based on changes. 
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Figure 1 – A causal model of how offense and offender facts affect the sentence 
 
The first set of studies examines the causal path that runs from “conviction charges” and “apparent 
facts” through the judge to the sentence. Conditional on the charge and facts that result from 
prosecutorial discretion, the judge imposes the sentence, and one can say that sentencing is disparate, 
conditional on those prosecutor-mediated facts. The second set of studies examines the causal path that 
runs from the facts through the sentence. Discretion exercised by prosecutors and judges is cumulative, 
so the disparity is jointly attributable to the prosecutor and judge. Our study shows that the first branch 
of the causal path (which involves the prosecutor) has changed little during the period of our study; that 
is, prosecutorial charging and bargaining practices have remained constant over the study period, or 
when practices have changed, the change has been the same for white and black offenders. In contrast, 
the second path (which involves the judge) has changed considerably; that is, judges have changed their 
behaviors conditional on the facts presented to them. While prosecutorial behaviors have remained 
fairly constant, racial disparity has increased. Although these trends toward greater disparity postdate 
Booker, we cannot say that Booker caused them and we cannot say what would happen if Booker were 
reversed. 
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Another line of enquiry has investigated inter-judge sentencing disparity post-Booker. This work 
has been limited because the USSC has not provided guidelines data matched with judge identifiers. As a 
result, studying inter-judge disparity on a wide scale using data that account for extensive variation in 
offense seriousness and offender criminal records has been restricted. Except for studies done at the 
Commission (Commission, 2012) and a study by Yang (2013) discussed below, researchers have had to 
work with data that have limited geographic (Scott, 2010) or offense (Mason & Bjerk, 2013) coverage, or 
with datasets that have limited detail about offenses and offenders (Hofer, 2012; Yang, 2014), or the 
studies have examined variation across districts rather than judges (Lynch & Omori, 2014). In contrast, 
the data used in this study have judge identifiers for all felonies and serious misdemeanors sentenced in 
federal courts between 2005 and 2012. Having similarly matched judges to guideline cases, Yang (2014) 
reports that judges who are appointed to the bench post-Booker are more likely to depart from the 
guidelines, but we could not replicate those findings.12 Using the same data and applying a simple 
analysis of variance technique, Yang (2013) shows that inter-judge disparity has increased from pre-
Booker to post-Gall.13 
As explained in the methodology section (section 4.0), we examine systematic differences across 
judges in the imposition of sentences for white and black offenders. Others have reported intra-judge 
disparity; applying more formality to the problem, similar to an approach used by others (Anderson & 
Spohn, 2010), our statistical model uses a random effect regression to estimate intra-judge disparity. 
Intra-judge disparity—as estimated using random effects—is less easily excused as disparate 
prosecutorial decision making or by unobserved factors relevant to sentencing because judges 
                                                          
12 Yang faced fundamental limitations because her post-Booker data timeframe was short and judges were Bush 
appointees. When using a longer timeframe, we found that judges who were appointed pre-Booker were more 
likely to issue disparate sentences. 
13 Yang assumed that cases are randomly assigned to judges within districts, an assumption that seems reasonable 
given the rules used by most districts to assign cases and an assumption that passes diagnostic testing for that 
analysis. Our analysis is based on a similar assumption, but we control for offense and offender characteristics. As 
a result, our findings are less sensitive to whether or not assignment is random. 
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essentially receive a random selection of cases for sentencing. We consider the estimation of random 
effects as a methodological advance. 
Finally, our study differs from other studies by examining a longer period of post-Booker 
sentencing. Extant studies discussed previously have examined a shorter period. Our study may reveal 
trends that were obscured by a shorter period. 
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3.0 Defining disparity 
There is no universally accepted definition of sentencing disparity. We propose a working definition 
to support empirical analysis. The working definition is necessarily abstract and readers who are less 
concerned with methodology may wish to skip sections 3.0 and 4.0 after reviewing the following 
summary. This section presents an argument for estimating the following: 
• How blacks are disadvantaged compared to whites at the time of sentencing. 
• How that disadvantage varies with offense seriousness and criminal record. 
• How that disadvantage has varied over time. 
• How the dispersion of sentences in general has varied over time. 
We specify an operational model where the effect of race can be divided into four components: a 
basic race effect (first bullet), a race effect interacted with the guideline cell (second bullet), a race 
effect interacted with time (third bullet), and a skedastic function (dispersion about the regression line) 
as a function of time (fourth bullet).  
3.1 Disparity and the rule of law 
In the abstract, under the rule of law, offenders should know what will happen to them if they 
are convicted of a crime, and offenders convicted of similar crimes under similar circumstances should 
expect to receive similar sentences. In the abstract, then, there should be a function where a sentence S 
follows from the facts surrounding case A, the offender’s criminal history B, and concessions made by 
the government in exchange for cooperation C: 
[1] ( )CBAfS ,,=  
Throughout this report, we measure the sentence as the length of time sentenced to prison.14 
The function represents a normative standard, and any departure from this standard is called disparity. 
                                                          
14 For less serious crimes, we could examine the decision to impose a prison term. Most federal crimes for which 
the guidelines are relevant result in prison terms. As a result, the decision whether to sentence to prison is of 
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In the abstract, a study of disparity is straightforward: Given equation [1], a researcher simply needs to 
measure the extent to which sentences depart from this standard. 
An immediate problem is determining the standard to which a researcher can identify and 
measure disparity. There are three issues. First, what are the specific components of A, B, and C? 
Second, how should those components be weighted by importance? Third, how should the weighted 
components be combined to determine a sentence? 
Congress has set broad parameters on the imposition of sentences in the form of statutory 
minimums and maximums. Presumably, sentences that fall outside these parameters are disparate, but 
that standard is not especially helpful because the parameters are wide and few sentences are imposed 
illegally outside these bounds. Within these broad parameters, Congress has delegated to the USSC, 
subject to Congressional veto, the power to determine the standard. The guidelines identify the 
elements of A, B, and C; specify how those elements should be weighted; and instruct how those 
weighted elements should be combined to impose a sentence. Essentially, the guidelines provide 
equation [1], subject to major caveats. 
One caveat is that the guidelines were never an exact formula for imposing a sentence. The 
guidelines always gave judges latitude to sentence within a 25% range and always allowed judges to 
depart from the range when warranted. The justification is that while the guidelines should apply to 
most cases, the sentencing judge may uncover exceptional cases that require less severe or more severe 
punishment. 
Although the guidelines always allowed judicial latitude, the Commission stipulated factors that 
could not be considered—such as race or sex—when departing from the guidelines. Prior to Booker, 
disparity might be defined as sentences that were explained by forbidden factors (e.g., race) or that 
                                                          
secondary importance. The analysis of this binary outcome poses a few new analytic problems that are not 
considered when studying the prison sentence. Therefore, this design report does not consider the analysis of 
binary outcomes. 
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departed from the guidelines without acceptable justification. Prior to Booker, sentencing disparity was 
conceptually simple to define. 
Post-Booker, existence of a standard is arguable and disparity is more difficult to define. The 
guidelines are advisory but, under Booker, they are still important as a standard that a judge must 
consult prior to imposing a sentence. The problem is that a sentence departing from the advisory 
guidelines cannot be identified as disparate because Booker and subsequent court decisions have ceded 
judges authority to impose sentences they see as appropriate given the purposes of sentencing. This 
means that after giving due consideration to the guidelines, an individual judge can make his or her own 
determination of equation [1]—the elements that are relevant for sentencing, how they should be 
weighted, and how they should be combined. One might even conclude that post-Booker, there is no 
meaningful standard. 
3.2 How to define disparity post-Booker 
How, then, should a researcher define and estimate sentencing disparity? The answer requires 
expanding the vocabulary used to describe sentencing disparity. A researcher can always observe how 
the sentence imposed differs from the sentence recommended by the guidelines. A difference cannot 
be declared to be disparate given that judges have discretion to depart from the guidelines. 
Nevertheless, some patterns in those differences are suggestive of disparity. To explain, this section 
identifies a model of how sentences are imposed and explains what that model tells or suggests about 
disparity. We start with a relatively simple model and progressively incorporate complexity. 
We start with a model of how sentences are imposed within a given guideline cell. Rewrite 
equation [1] as equation [2]. The subscripts identify the ith offender sentenced by the jth judge in the kth 
guideline cell. The ijke  represents the difference between the average sentences imposed within 
guideline cell k and the sentence actually imposed: 
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[2] ijkkijk eSS +=  
kS is the average sentence imposed for offenders sentenced within the kth guideline cell. A researcher 
would be concerned with observed patterns of e.  
We consider a guideline cell to be an anchor; specifically, we consider the mean sentence within 
the guideline cell as a standard. It is possible that judges, as a collective, have common rules for 
departing from the guidelines. One way to account for a common rule is to introduce additional 
explanatory variables: 
[3] ijkkijkkijk eXSS ++= β  
X is a row vector of variables associated with the ith offender sentenced by the jth judge in the kth cell. In 
this relatively simple model, the weight assigned to these additional factors (the column vector β) is the 
weighted average over judges. (Weights are proportional to the number of offenders sentenced per 
judge.) To the extent that these variables explain some of the residual variance, sentencing decisions 
will be uniform (but different from the guidelines) and the distribution of e will be smaller. Provided it 
excludes clearly inappropriate considerations, such as race, the kijkX β term is not disparity; rather, it 
represents a judicial consensus of how the average sentence should vary systematically within a 
guideline cell. 
Many A, B, and C variables exist, and it is impractical and arguably unnecessary to include all of 
the variables in a statistical model.15 Because the guidelines already factor most X variables into the 
identification of the guideline cell (e.g., the seriousness of the offense and the danger posed by the 
                                                          
15 Some researchers have followed a tradition of introducing a presumably comprehensive set of explanatory 
variables into a regression. A problem with this approach is that it altogether ignores the structure imposed by the 
guidelines and replaces that known structure with a statistical search for the correct model. This is a daunting and 
uncertain exercise that we forego by anchoring our analysis on the guideline cell and then looking for systematic 
departures from that anchor. 
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offender), there is limited variation with which to base inferences.16 Consequently, this study will make 
limited attempts to add X variables to the model, only incorporating them into the analysis when they 
are obviously important. Nevertheless, we know from reviewers’ comments on an earlier draft that the 
decision to include some X variables and exclude others is contentious, and we return to the issue in the 
next subsection. 
So far, the discussion has considered residual variance within a guideline cell as variance that is 
unexplained by the legitimate factors (including knowledge of the applicable guideline cell) incorporated 
into the estimation. Unexplained residual variance is not the same as disparity, but it is probative. 
Expanding the model specification goes more directly to the issue: 
[4] ijkkijkkijkijk eZXSS +++= γβ  
The Z represents factors that Congress and the Commission recognize as inappropriate considerations 
during sentencing (see appendix A). For our purposes, the important Z variable is race. 
Again, currently there is disagreement about the legal standing of the Commission’s policy 
statements, but we doubt that many readers would argue race—the principal focus of this analysis—is 
ever a valid consideration at the time of sentencing. Given the model represented by equation [4], 
interesting aspects of the problem are— 
• Does theγ in equation [4] differ from zero? The question is whether there is systematic 
difference across offenders in sentences with regard to race.  
• In equation [4], after accounting for systematic differences in X (common rules used by judges 
for departing from the guidelines) and Z (race and other factors that should not be considered 
                                                          
16 For example, for property crimes the dollar value of the loss is a primary determinate of offense seriousness. But 
within a guideline cell, there is likely to be little variation in dollar loss. A regression (the statistical procedure used 
to estimate the parameters in equation [3]) will be uninformative when the independent variable (the X in the 
equation) has small variation. 
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during sentencing), what is the residual variation in e (the average difference between the 
average sentence imposed within the guideline cell and the sentence actually imposed)? 
• Has the residual variation in e changed over time? 
An extension to [4] almost completes the modeling. Although the β and γ parameters vary across the 
guideline cells, as written in equation [4], the parameters are otherwise fixed as researchers frequently 
use that term with hierarchical linear models. An extension is to write the parameters as being random, 
so that [4] is written as [5]: 
[5] ijkijkijkkijkijk eZXSS +++= γβ  
Note that [4] and [5] are the same, except for the new subscripts that appear on the γ parameter. The 
appearance of the j subscripts allows for the weight that each individual judge assigns to the variable Z 
to vary. Some additional structure is required to understand this. Presuming for simplicity that Z is a 
single variable (a dummy variable representing the condition that the offender is black), we might 
express γ as a function of a new vector of variables W .17 
[6] jWkijkkijk uW ++= γγγ  
Here ijkγ is the effect that being black has on the sentence within the kth cell. The ijW are interesting 
variables that explain systematic patterns in the effects of race (being black) on sentences within the kth 
cell. This formulation is often called a hierarchical linear model or a random effect model. It decomposes 
the effect of race into three parts. Parameter kγ captures the direct effect that race has on the sentence 
imposed. For example, this parameter might cause us to infer that, on average, black offenders receive 
longer prison terms than do white offenders, taking other factors into account. Parameter Wkγ captures 
the effect of interacting race with some other variable W. For example, if the other variable (W) is the 
                                                          
17 Model specifications need to provide additional variables for whites and other races entering the analysis. For 
simplicity, we do not show those additional races. 
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year when the sentence was imposed, this parameter might cause us to infer that, over time, black 
offenders receive prison terms that are increasingly longer than the terms received by white offenders, 
when taking other factors into account. This is helpful for studying trends. The first two decomposition 
effects are called fixed effects and a third is called a random effect. The random effect uj is attributable 
to the specific judge imposing a sentence. Statisticians might say that judge is nested within race, but 
regardless of the wording, the point is that judges have different reactions to an offender’s race.18 
A final question concerns what to include as X, Z, and W variables. The question has no simple 
answer and we know from reviewers’ comments that the answer is contentious. We explain our 
approach using the concept of bundling, explained in the next subsection. 
3.3 Race is bundled with other factors 
When studying racial disparity in sentencing, it is necessary to define race and racial disparity. The 
definition may be comparatively simple for a geneticist, who might observe that whites and blacks 
fundamentally share a genetic pool with a few differences that account for skin color; predisposition 
toward certain diseases, such as sickle cell anemia; and other factors. However, when used in the 
context of social responses to race, including criminal sentencing, race seems to mean something other 
than genetic variation. 
Numerous studies show that blacks have been sociologically and economically disadvantaged; as a 
racial group, they have less education, lower earnings, more serious criminal records, and other factors 
distinguishable, on average, from whites. The authors of this report think of genetically defined race as 
being bundled with these social and economic factors. 
                                                          
18 One reviewer of an earlier draft of this report observed that researchers using hierarchical linear models 
typically follow our approach of identifying a variable, such as race, whose effect is allowed to vary with time, 
while other variables are presumed to have fixed effects. The reviewer’s objection is that this is a specification 
error. We grant the validity of this point but assert that justification for using this potentially misspecified model 
comes from the advantage of simplifying a model that otherwise would become so complex as to be 
uninterpretable. 
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When studying racial disparities in sentencing, we must make a decision: Should we seek to 
estimate a pure genetic race effect by controlling for the bundled factors? Or should we treat those 
bundled factors as inseparable from race and not account for them in the analysis? Or should we 
account for some of the bundled factors and ignore others? Reviewers of an earlier draft of this report 
had differing opinions. 
We have a preferred approach, although we also attempted to accommodate different opinions. 
Overall, we prefer to study the effect of race as a bundle of factors, so that our analysis has a race 
variable but no control variables for education, employment, and other factors associated with race. 
With exceptions, identified and justified below, the only control variables are those recognized by the 
guidelines.19 
One exception is that we include a covariate that captures nuances in criminal records. To explain, 
the guidelines already identify criminal history categories, derived from collapsing more detailed 
criminal history scores. Because judges potentially see the criminal history scores, because the 
differences between these scores and the criminal history categories may be considered at the time of 
sentencing, and because criminal history is generally considered an appropriate consideration at 
sentencing, we included a transformation of the criminal history scores as covariates. The 
transformation is explained in section 5.1. 
In addition to criminal history scores, our preferred model controls for the judicial circuit in the 
regression specification. Empirically, circuits that tend to sentence both white and black offenders 
harshly, compared to other circuits, tend to have a higher proportion of black offenders. Circuits that 
tend to sentence both white and black offenders leniently, compared to other circuits, tend to have a 
                                                          
19 One can argue that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have a built-in, but not necessarily intentional, racial bias. 
The recently changed crack cocaine guidelines illustrate this built-in bias. As another example, blacks may acquire 
lengthier criminal histories than whites for reasons that have nothing to do with inherent criminality, and because 
the guidelines take criminal record into account, blacks may be disadvantaged. This study, which takes the 
guidelines as a normative standard, is not a study of built-in racial disparity. 
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lower proportion of black offenders. Even if blacks suffered no racial disadvantage within every circuit, 
black offenders would appear to be disadvantaged at the national level if the circuit were not taken into 
account. In the case of circuits, we have unbundled circuit as a race attribute. This approach is arguable, 
so we have made accommodations in the form of sensitivity testing. While we focus attention on the 
regression specification with circuit dummy variables, we also report findings from a regression that 
lacks circuits as a control variable and from a regression that substitutes districts for circuits.20 
Thus, our preferred model includes a transformed version of criminal history score and circuits as 
the X variables, but at the request of reviewers, we have added education and employment to the 
model to see if these factors account for some of the racial effect. We report findings as a sensitivity test 
of the preferred model. 
Despite reviewer recommendations, we do not include covariates that may differentiate offenders 
within guideline cells. For example, the guidelines may place some property offenders and some drug-
law violators into the same guideline cell. Despite the fact that these two types of offenders fall into the 
same guideline cell, judges may treat drug offenders more severely than property offenders. If drug 
offenders are more likely to be black, then failing to distinguish between property offenders and drug 
offenders within the same guideline cell may mistakenly associate valid reasons for sentence differences 
to race. From this perspective, the analysis should account for within-guideline differences in crimes. 
While giving credit to this argument, we find it difficult to deal with the problem. The differences 
within guideline cells are idiosyncratic and accounting for them would require complicated statistical 
analysis that might obscure more than it explains.21 Furthermore, unless the intra-cell differences 
                                                          
20 One review noted that we should use districts to remove regional variations, and while the reviewer’s arguments 
are persuasive, the use of districts instead of circuits does not materially change results. We found that some 
models could not be estimated when district was substituted for circuit. 
21 Reviewers have suggested adding dummy variables to account for offense type, but on reflection, this simple 
solution loses its appeal. Depending on the refinement of the offense type variable, certain offenses will appear in 
a limited number of guideline cells, where they will be proxies for those cells. The parameters associated with 
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uniformly favor whites (or blacks) across all of the cells, the existence of those intra-cell differences will 
not bias estimates of black–white disparity across the cells. Because we have no reason to presume that 
the guideline cells were constructed systematically to disadvantage blacks, we prefer to treat the intra-
cell differences as essentially random across cells. We recognize that this argument will not satisfy all 
readers.22 
Although we adopt a simple model with few X variables, based on reading and discussions with 
others, we felt that the structure of equation [5] may differ across settings, an expectation confirmed by 
statistical testing. Evidence shows that females are sentenced less severely than are males. Some 
analysts might deal with this difference by using a dummy variable in a single regression to distinguish 
males from females, but we disagree with that approach. Adding a sex variable as a linear additive effect 
will not account for the fact that the β and γ parameters differ for males and females. (The truth of this 
assertion is demonstrated when discussing empirical results.) Instead of using a dummy variable to 
distinguish sex, we partition the data into 14 strata (see section 4.1) and estimate separate regressions 
for each partition. The β and γ parameters differ demonstrably across these partitions. As a result, we 
cannot simply add dummy variables as control variables.23 
The disadvantage of this approach is that with 14 partitions, we have 14 results. However, this is 
only a bookkeeping disadvantage. As explained in the next section, the dependent variable is 
standardized. As a result, the parameters of interest are in the same units and can be averaged across 
                                                          
those dummy variables will not have their usual interpretation as shift parameters. The use of offense variables 
may introduce specification errors that actually mask race effects. 
22 Furthermore, considering the bundling argument, the question about intra-cell variation may be unanswerable. 
In the property crime and drug crime example, one could plausibly argue that within a guideline cell, judges 
sentence drug offenders more severely because they are predominately black, while property offenders are 
predominately white. 
23 It is possible to specify a model that has interactions between the partitions and the α and β parameters, but 
that is essentially the same as estimating separate models for each partition. 
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partitions, allowing us to make summary statements about disparity in sentencing without reporting the 
results for all 14 partitions.  
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4.0 Statistical methodology: A random effect model 
This methodology section has two components. The first section discusses estimation and the 
second section describes the data and variables used in the analysis. 
4.1 Estimation 
The previous section identified a theoretical model for measuring sentencing disparity. The 
model is potentially useful because it answers questions relevant to this study. Unfortunately, the model 
is not practically useful as written for two reasons: (1) there are too few observations per guideline cell 
to estimate parameters reliably and (2) there is no simple way to summarize results across the 258 
guideline cells. Recognizing these problems, this section provides a model simplification that retains the 
important aspects of modeling already discussed. 
We have defined ijkS as the sentenced imposed on the ith offender by the jth judge in the kth 
guideline cell. For reasons to be explained, it will be convenient and useful to rescale the sentence. Let
kN be the number of sentences imposed within cell k.  
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This rescaled measure has two useful properties: (1) within any cell, the average rescaled sentence will 
be zero and (2) within any cell, the standard deviation for the rescaled sentence will be one. Using this 
rescaled version of the sentence, we write the model using all the cells as— 
 [8] 
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Equation [8] looks similar to equation [5], but there are important differences: 
• Equation [5] pertained to a specific guideline cell, while equation [8] applies to all guideline cells. 
• In equation [5], the β and γ have k subscripts, implying that those parameters vary from cell to 
cell, but the k subscript has been dropped in equation [8], implying that those parameters are 
invariant across the cells. Given 258 guideline cells, this reduces the parameter space by a 
multiple of 258, greatly reducing the estimation problem and providing a useful summary 
measure across cells. This simplification may be an incorrect specification, and we will 
subsequently introduce some model flexibility. 
• Although we have retained the β and γ notation, these are not the same parameters as those in 
equation [5]. Rescaling Sijk causes the interpretation of the parameters to change, so parameters 
are now interpreted as changes in standard deviation units. Although this is analytically 
convenient, readers may have trouble interpreting standard deviation units, but we will discuss 
how standard deviation units can be translated back into natural units to facilitate 
interpretation. 
The dependent variable now has a mean of zero and a variance of one for every guideline cell, so 
treating the β as the same across the cells is equivalent to saying that a unit change in variable X 
increases the sentence by β standard deviations, regardless of the cell. Likewise, treating the γ as the 
same across the cells is equivalent to saying that a unit change in variable Z increases the sentence by γ 
 29 
Federal Sentencing Disparity, 2005–2012  
standard deviations, regardless of the cell. Using standardized scores greatly simplifies interpretation of 
the statistical analysis because a standard deviation change is the same, regardless of the cell.  
Although using standardized scores simplifies the model, the simplification may be an incorrect 
specification leading to misleading conclusions. We take two steps to guard against misspecification. The 
first step is to introduce the year when the sentence was imposed as a W variable. This allows us to 
determine whether the severity of sentences is increasing or decreasing over time.24 We also introduce 
the year when the sentences imposed interacted with the variable black as another W variable. This 
allows the proportionality of sentences imposed on white and black offenders to vary systematically 
across time. (For additional flexibility, we use a linear spline with the date of the Gall decision as the join 
point.) The second step is to introduce the maximum of the guideline cell as a W variable. This allows 
the proportionality of sentences imposed on white and black offenders to vary systematically across the 
guideline cells. Think of the statistical model as estimating a smoothed version of the relationship 
between sentences for white and black offenders across the guideline cells and over time. 
An attractive feature of building a statistical model capturing variation in sentences for white 
and black offenders is that the results from the statistical model are readily expressed using figures.  
The analysis will deal with special considerations. For relatively minor crimes committed by 
offenders with minor criminal records, there is a practical lower limit on the sentence imposed: Time 
served may be zero for offenders sentenced to probation. For comparatively serious crimes committed 
by offenders with major criminal records, there is a practical upper limit on the sentence imposed, and 
some sentences may be very long (e.g., when a judge imposes consecutive sentences). Researchers have 
struggled with ways to deal with censored variables (as the above problem is known in the econometrics 
literature (Sullivan, McGloin, & Piquero, 2008; Britt, 2009; Ulmer, Light, & Kramer, 2011), but there is a 
                                                          
24 More accurately, given the model specification, we are able to determine whether sentence severity for white 
offenders is increasing or decreasing over time. The interaction of time with black offenders tells us how the 
sentences for black offenders relative to white offenders—the measure of racial disparity—has changed over time. 
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special consideration for this study. Many of the solutions do not lend themselves to hierarchical 
modeling, at least not using conventional software. Examining sentences imposed under the guidelines, 
within most guideline cells, shows that most offenders receive jail or prison terms. We can include most 
guideline cells within the study by setting a rule: Include a cell when 85% or more of the offenders 
sentenced within the cell receive some prison time.25 Within each cell, sentences for offenders who 
received non-prison sentences are set to zero. (See the table at the beginning of appendix B.) Within 
each cell, sentences for offenders who received non-prison sentences are set to zero. Adopting this 
allows us to use a linear hierarchical model for the analysis.26 
Limiting the analysis to certain cells does not bias the analysis because selection is based on an 
exogenous variable: guideline cell.27 However, we acknowledge that the findings pertain strictly to these 
included cells. We could have relaxed the inclusion rule, but dealing with probation terms requires 
special considerations. In the federal system, terms of probation typically come with onerous behavioral 
restrictions, including house arrest and electronic monitoring. When only a few sentences are to 
probation, we do not set the sentence to zero. However, if a larger number of probation sentences were 
included, we would have to deal with the terms of probation varying in severity.28 
                                                          
25 This still leaves a lower limit problem, but a linear model will provide a consistent estimate of the average 
sentence when there is a lower limit. Standard errors are corrected using robust standard errors. The upper limits 
are a minor problem. A reviewer of an earlier draft disagreed with this statement, so some clarification is required. 
Using OLS when data are censored will lead to inconsistent estimates of the parameters in an underlying latent 
variable model, a problem discussed extensively in the econometrics literature. However, a correctly specified OLS 
model will be consistent for the conditional mean by definition. This distinction is discussed by Angrist and Pischke 
(2009), among others. Our claims about consistency pertain to the conditional mean. 
26 With exceptions, guidelines are not required for misdemeanors below class A misdemeanors. Consequently, the 
least serious federal crimes are not sentenced under the guidelines. U.S. Attorneys often employ declination 
standards that limit federal prosecution to serious crimes, and less serious crimes are referred to state courts. 
These two observations may explain why most federal offenders sentenced under the guidelines receive some 
prison time. 
27 One might argue that the guideline cell is not exogenous. The argument is that prosecutors wait to determine 
the judge appointed to the case and then manipulate the facts surrounding the case in recognition of judge 
sentencing proclivities. If this happens, the effect does not appear to be large (Yang, 2013), so we treat the 
guideline cell as exogenous. 
28 Some reviewers of an earlier version of this report encouraged us to extend the analysis to probation terms, 
suggesting that we estimate separate regressions with binary outcomes (e.g., logistic or probit models). We see 
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Expecting application of the guidelines to vary across certain offense and offender groups, we 
partition our data into 14 strata.29 Separate analyses are performed within each stratum. The strata are 
defined as follows: 
• The USSC makes a useful distinction between upward departures (always attributable to the 
judge), downward departures that are attributable to the judge, and downward departures that 
are attributable to the government.30 Downward departures attributable to the government are 
legitimate rewards for cooperating with the government to further criminal cases against 
others. It seems best to assume that departures attributable to the government fundamentally 
alter the application of the guidelines. As a result, the analysis described above (and illustrated 
below) should be done separately for cases that have departures attributable to the 
government and for cases that do not have departures attributable to the government. We 
make that distinction for this study, so the explanation of sentence variation is found exclusively 
in judicial decision making. 
• Federal criminal law always sets an upper limit on the sentence and, for some crimes, federal 
criminal law sets a lower limit greater than zero. Mandatory minimum sentences are especially 
likely for drug violations, and these mandatory minimums are often so severe that Congress has 
provided provisions allowing judges to ignore the mandatory minimums for a class of offenders 
(see appendix A). Weapons enhancements, which often trigger mandatory minimum sentences, 
are incorporated into the guidelines. The rules for sentencing drug offenders, those who receive 
                                                          
the required analysis as more difficult than suggested by the reviewers, and resource and time limitations 
precluded taking probation sentences into account. 
29 One might argue that there should be more or fewer partitions. In its study of the use of mandatory minimum 
penalties across 13 districts, the USSC partitioned offenses into drug offenses, firearm offenses, and child 
pornography offenses (Commission, 2011, pp. 111-115)—essentially the same partitioning that we have used. The 
Commission also distinguished aggravated identity theft, but we did not make that partition because there are too 
few cases to treat these as a partition. 
30 A departure is a sentence that is higher than the upper guidelines limit or lower than the lower guidelines limit. 
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weapons enhancements, and other offenders are so different that we have created a second 
partition determined by four broad offense categories: 
o drug violations that do not involve weapons enhancement 
o nondrug violations that do not involve weapons enhancements 
o drug violations that involve weapons enhancements 
o nondrug violations that involve weapons enhancements. 
In the federal system, sex offenses are mostly for child pornography, and most of the 
convictions for sex offenses are of white offenders. As a result, analyzing disparity among sex 
offenses is of little interest. Nondrug violations account for all nondrug crimes, excluding sex 
offenses. However, when examining sentence variation across judges, where race is not a 
consideration, sex offenses make up their own class. 
• Although being male or female is not a legitimate consideration according to guideline policy 
statements, sex has an important effect on sentence imposed. This justifies treating sex as a 
stratifying variable.  
Females are rare participants in offenses that involve weapons enhancements. As a result, every 
partition involving females and weapons enhancements is treated as null. Also, females are rarely 
participants in sex violations. In summary, ignoring sex violations, we partition the data into 12 subsets: 
eight subsets for males and four subsets for females. We repeat the same analyses for each of the 12 
subsets. When estimating the skedastic function, we use all 14 cells because race is not a factor for the 
skedastic function. 
The principal analysis eliminates noncitizens. The treatment of noncitizens differs from the 
treatment of citizens for at least four reasons. First, the guidelines factors—especially those required to 
construct the criminal history category—are likely to be imprecise for noncitizens. Second, noncitizens 
can be deported, so the stakes at issue are different for citizens and noncitizens. Third, race appears to 
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be inaccurately reported for noncitizens, who are (according to the data) predominately white 
Hispanics. Fourth, fast-track provision introduces a complication that requires special attention going 
beyond the analysis reported in this study (McClellan & Sands, 2006; Gorman, 2010; Cole, 2012). 
Consequently, we drop noncitizens from the principal analysis, but given that noncitizens are a large 
proportion of federal offenders, we report a preliminary analysis of noncitizens in appendix C. 
4.2 Data and variables 
The USSC maintains a detailed database pertaining to the application of guidelines; this study 
uses an extract of variables from those data. The box below lists the specific variables from the USSC 
database that entered into our analysis. This list allows interested readers to track variables back to the 
USSC’s data. 
The box puts variables into three categories. The first category includes stratification variables 
that were used to identify the 14 strata and to determine if an offender was a U.S. citizen. The second 
category—the dependent variable—is the sentence. The third category identifies variables used to 
determine independent variables. 
Stratification variables 
FEMALE A variable coded by the USSC that equals 1 if the offender is female. 
REAS* The first, second, etc. reason given by the court for why the sentence imposed was outside the range 
(there are 10 variables, for REAS1 to REAS10). The value indicating substantial assistance is “19” 
((5K 1.1) substantial assistance with government motion). These departures are explained in appendix 
A. 
BookerCD An additional variable used to identify a handful of additional substantial assistance cases. The post-
Booker reporting categories (there are 12 categories) are based on the relationship between the 
sentence and guideline range and the reason(s) given for being outside of the range. The value 
indicating substantial assistance is “5.” 
OFFTYPE2 The offense type variable used to determine drug offenders (values “10,” ”11,” and ”12”) and sex 
offenders (values “4,” ”28,” ”42,” ”43,” and “44”). 
WEAPON Used to identify weapons offenders. It is a USSC-created variable, where 1 indicates the offender 
received a specific offense characteristics (SOC) weapons enhancement or had an 18:924(C) charge 
present. 
NEWCIT Used to identify U.S. citizens. The value “0” indicates a U.S. citizen. 
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Dependent variable 
TOTPRISN The total number of months of imprisonment ordered. Sentences of less than 1 month are coded as 
zero. In its analysis, the USSC chose to include alternative sentences (i.e., home confinement, 
community confinement, and intermittent confinement), but these alternatives are not considered to 
be prison terms in our analysis. This variable is top-coded at 470 months, meaning that any sentence 
in excess of 470 months (including life terms and death sentences) are recoded to  
470 months. 
 
Independent variables 
XCRHISSR The offender’s final criminal history category (I–VI), as determined by the court. The guidelines 
translate the total criminal history points into the six categories defined by the criminal history 
category. 
XFOLSOR The final offense level, as determined by the court. The combination of XCRHISSR and XFOLSOR 
indicates the guideline cell. 
MONRACE The race of the offender: white, black, and other race. Race is independent of Hispanic ethnicity. Note 
that while our findings are focused on non-Hispanic whites and non-Hispanic blacks or African 
Americans, the analysis uses data representing all races identified by the USSC. We removed any 
offender with an unreported race from the analysis. 
HISPORIG An indication of Hispanic ethnicity. We designate an offender as Hispanic if this variable is coded “2” 
(i.e., we consider an offender of Hispanic ethnicity only if there is an indication of Hispanic origin). 
XMAXSOR The maximum guidelines range for imprisonment, as determined by the court. When used in the 
analysis, XMAXSOR is recoded to a maximum of 470 (including life terms) and is rescaled by dividing 
by 470. The recoded variable runs from 0 to 1. 
SENTYR The year the sentence was imposed. When used in this analysis, SENTYR is recoded from 2005-2012, 
to 0- 1 by subtracting 2005 and dividing by 7. 
We allow the time trend to break near the Gall v. United States decision. Since it was decided on 
December 10, 2007, we allowed the break for sentences filed beginning on January 1, 2008. 
TOTCHPTS The offender’s total criminal history points. To capture the variation of criminal history with each 
criminal history level that may explain differences in sentencing, we use the criminal history points 
interacted with the offender’s criminal history level (XCRHISSR). In particular, for every offender, we 
standardize his or her criminal history points within the offender’s criminal history level. For example, 
if an offender has a criminal history level of III, his or her criminal history points are standardized with 
all other offenders that have a criminal history level of III. Then, we interact the standardized history 
points with the criminal history categories and insert this measure into the statistical models (as six 
variables, for each of the six criminal history categories). 
NEWCNVTN Indicates that the adjudication decision was reached by a trial. This variable enters the model as a 
covariate. 
MONCIRC Indicates the judicial circuit in which the offender was sentenced. We used fixed effects to indicate 
the judicial circuit, using the 9th judicial circuit as a reference category. 
CIRCDIST Indicates the judicial district in which the offender was sentenced. 
JUDGE A unique identifier assigned to a judge, used as a random effect in the statistical models. 
 
For the analyses, we use USSC data for all offenders who were sentenced in fiscal years 2005 
through 2012. To distinguish those cases where government-initiated departures were not a factor from 
cases where government-initiated departures were a factor, we inspected the variables REAS1 through 
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REAS10. If any of these variables reported “(5K 1.1) substantial assistance with government motion,” 
then we assigned the case to the government-initiated departure category. The BookerCD variable 
identified a few additional government-sponsored downward departures. 
We identified the guideline cells by interacting the variables XFOLSOR and XCRHISSR. We 
computed the percentage of cases within each cell that resulted in prison and we discarded all cells 
where that rate was lower than 85%. Others (Ulmer, Light, & Kramer, 2011) have considered disparity 
in the imposition of prison terms, and we do not investigate that question. 
The dependent variable is a transformation of TOTPRISN. The transformation was described 
earlier using the formula: 
  k
kijk
ijk SC
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s
−
=
 
Substitute TOTPRISN for ijkS . 
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5.0 Analysis and interpretation 
Results are presented in two sections. The first section on sentencing disparity is divided into 
four subsections that pertain to the research questions raised in the introduction. Regression results are 
reported in appendices B and D; appendix C reports analyses for noncitizens. The second section 
pertains to prosecutorial discretion; this section tests whether the exercise of prosecutorial discretion 
has changed during the study period. Additional analyses regarding prosecutorial discretion appear in 
appendix D. 
Statistical output is voluminous; therefore, to assist the reader, we have taken the following 
steps in this section. First, we interpret the statistical results in detail for the analysis of one partition of 
the data. Interested readers can apply that interpretation to the tables appearing in appendices B and C. 
Second, we provide summary statements that appear in bold. These summary statements take 
advantage of the standardization of the dependent variable, which allows parameters to be averaged 
across strata. When we average, we take a simple average across the strata. Third, we report sensitivity 
testing in exhibits 1 to 3. 
5.1 Operational variables entering the analysis 
Estimation uses a multilevel mixed-effects linear model programmed as procedure mixed in 
version 13 of Stata. (This is xtmixed in earlier versions of Stata.) This section explains the modeling, 
interpretation, and presentation of results. (See appendix B for detailed findings and appendix C for 
results of analysis of noncitizens.) 
As described previously, the dependent variable is the rescaled total months of prison imposed. 
The fixed effects are: 
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Race/Ethnicity: Black This is a dummy variable that is coded one when the offender is black and coded 
zero otherwise. White offenders are the omitted category. Hispanic and other 
enter into the analysis, but we will not discuss these racial or ethnic categories 
separately because modeling for them is identical to modeling for blacks. 
year_pregall Calendar time is modeled with a linear spline. This variable models calendar 
time up to the Gall decision. Calendar time has been recoded to run from 0 at 
the beginning of the observation period to 1 at the end of the observation 
period. 
year_postgall  This variable models calendar time after the Gall decision. 
Black x Year Pre-2008 This is the year_pregall variable interacted with the Race/Ethnicity: Black 
variable. 
Black x Year Post-2008 This is the year_postgall variable interacted with the Race/Ethnicity: Black 
variable. 
Note that the parameters associated with the last two variables allow us to estimate how the 
sentencing disparity for white and black offenders has changed over time. Interpreting these parameter 
estimates is the principal concern of this study. 
Max Sentence in Guideline Cell This is the maximum sentence specified for the guideline cell. It has 
been top coded at 470 months and rescaled to run from 0 to 1. 
Black x Max Sentence This is Max Sentence in the guideline cell interacted with the 
Race/Ethnicity: Black variable. 
The introduction of these two variables relaxes the restrictive model specification by allowing 
the degree of racial disparity to vary across the guideline cells. Possible disparity is pronounced within 
guideline cells that call for relatively short sentences but is insignificant for guideline cells that call for 
comparatively long sentences. The use of the above two variables expands the model’s flexibility, and 
the parameters associated with the last variable estimate how disparity varies across the guideline cells. 
newcnvtn This is a dummy variable indicating that the offender was convicted by trial. 
c_pts_n There are six of these criminal history point variables distinguished by allowing n to run 
from 1 to 6. 
The c_pts_n variable requires comment: Guideline calculations assign criminal history points 
based on the offender’s criminal record and then collapse the criminal history points into six criminal 
history levels that form one dimension of the guideline grid. Because of the collapsing, actual criminal 
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histories are heterogeneous within guideline cells, and the c_pts_n variables take that heterogeneity 
into account. For example, c_pts_1 is the standardized criminal history points for offenders whose 
criminal history is classified in the first criminal history category. If the typically subtle distinctions in 
criminal history category matter at the time of sentencing, the parameters associated with the c_pts_n 
variables should be positive. Except as control variables, these parameters are of no interest to this 
study. 
circ_n There are 11 dummy variables, distinguished by allowing n to run from 1 to 11, that denote the 
circuit. The ninth circuit is the omitted reference category. 
Additionally, a sequence number distinguishing judge identity (JUDGE) enters the model as a 
random effect. For every judge, there is a judge random effect for white and black offenders. 
5.2 Findings regarding sentencing disparity 
Table 1 reports selected regression results31 for the regression using the data partition males, no 
drug violations or weapons enhancements, and no government-sponsored departures for substantial 
assistance.32 This partition includes 76,405 offenders who were sentenced by 1,292 judges. An average 
judge sentenced 60 offenders from this partition, but some sentenced only a single offender and at least 
1 judge sentenced 460 offenders. All of the shaded results are statistically significant at p < 0.01. 
Table 1 – Regression results: Males, no substantial assistance, no weapons or drugs 
Variables Parameter Standard error 95% confidence interval 
year_pregall -0.246 0.083 -0.409 -0.083 
year_postgall -0.207 0.038 -0.281 -0.133 
 Trend from 2005 to 2012 -0.222 0.029 -0.278 -0.166 
Race/Ethnicity: Black -0.031 0.033 -0.096 0.034 
Black x Year Pre-2008 0.446 0.116 0.218 0.673 
Black x Year Post-2008 -0.033 0.047 -0.126 0.060 
 Trend from 2005 to 2012 0.146 0.036 0.075 0.218 
                                                          
31 The data include Hispanic and other offenders, but they are not of principal interest for this report; therefore, 
results pertaining to Hispanic and others are suppressed. Similarly, we suppress the random effects for these two 
racial and ethnic groups. We also suppress the fixed circuit effects. Complete results appear in appendix B. 
32 We only show the parameter estimates that are of interest for estimating racial disparity. The appendix shows 
complete regression results. 
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Variables Parameter Standard error 95% confidence interval 
Max sentence in guideline cell -0.054 0.050 -0.152 0.044 
Black x Max Sentence -0.213 0.062 -0.334 -0.093 
     
Random effects parameters     
Variance (white) 0.075 0.006 0.063 0.087 
Variance (black) 0.077 0.007 0.063 0.091 
Covariance (white, black) 0.062 0.005 0.052 0.072 
Correlation (white, black) 0.808    
Var (residual) 0.889 0.020   
     
Observations 76,405    
Judges 1,292    
 
The first column in table 1 identifies selected variables that entered the regression. The table 
identifies the parameter in the first column and reports the parameter estimate in the second column, a 
heteroscedastic robust standard error in the third column, and a 95% confidence interval in the last two 
columns. When the confidence interval does not overlap 0, the parameter is deemed statistically 
significant at p < 0.05. The shading denotes parameters that are statistically significant at p < 0.01. 
The first two parameter estimates are associated with the variables “year_pregall” and 
“year_postgall.” Collectively, these provide a spline telling us how sentences have changed for white 
offenders between 2005 and 2012. These two parameters tell us roughly that the sentences imposed on 
white offenders have decreased by -(3/8)x0.246-(5/8)x0.207=-0.222 standardized units between 2005 
and 2012. This change is statistically significant at p < 0.01. For white males convicted of crimes other 
than drug violations and weapons offenses, and who did not provide substantial assistance to the 
government, sentences became more lenient between 2005 and 2012.  
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Moreover, based on the results 
reported in appendix B, examining the 
estimated changes over the 8-year period, 
it appears that white males and females 
received sentences that decreased in 
severity. When we include sex offenders 
in the analysis, there is an estimated 
reduction in 13 of 14 strata. The change is 
statistically significant at p < 0.01 in six tests and at p < 0.05 in another three tests. Given that the 
dependent variable is measured in standardized units, the changes appear large: The simple average 
change over the 14 strata is -0.22 standardized units, which is significant at p < 0.001. Apparently, 
judges have exercised discretion during the post-Booker era to reduce the average length of time that 
offenders serve in prison. Although overall trends in sentences are not the main concern of this report, 
we note that the study is being conducted within an overall context of increasing leniency in federal 
sentencing. Sensitivity testing reported in exhibit 1 indicates that findings are insensitive to model 
specification. 
Our interest is principally focused on the parameters associated with Black x Year Pre-2008 and 
Black x Year Post-2008 because these parameters estimate how disparity (the difference between the 
average sentence for blacks and whites) has changed over time. From Booker to Gall, the disparity 
increased (p < 0.01), but it does not appear to have changed any more since Gall.  To consider the entire 
period post-Booker, see the parameter associated with Trend from 2005 to 2012. Over the entire post-
Booker period, the sentences imposed on black offenders have increased by 0.146 standardized units, 
an amount that is statistically significant at p < 0.01. Interestingly, we previously reported that the 
sentences imposed on white offenders decreased by 0.222 standardized units, and now we report that 
Exhibit 1. There has been a trend toward more lenient 
sentences 
In the preferred model, sentence severity for white 
offenders decreased by an average of 0.222 standardized 
units between 2005 and 2012 (p < 0.01). When the model 
substitutes district fixed effects for circuit fixed effects, the 
estimated decrease in overall sentence severity is 0.194 
standardized units (p < 0.01). When fixed effects are 
omitted from the model, the decrease is 0.226 (p < 0.01). 
Returning to the preferred model and including age and 
education as covariates, we find that sentence severity fell 
by 0.215 standardized units (p < 0.01). The decrease in 
sentence severity for white offenders appears robust to 
model specification. 
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racial disparity in sentencing has increased by 0.146 standardized units, implying that blacks did not 
receive harsher sentences between 2005 and 2012; rather, blacks have not benefited as much from the 
increased leniency afforded to whites, and this has widened disparity.  
Excluding sex offenses (because there are few black sex offenders) in all eight strata where we 
contrasted the sentences for black males and white males, the trends in sentences for black males 
were increasingly longer than the sentences for white males. The contrast was statistically significant 
at p < 0.01 in four of the eight contrasts, and it was significant at p < 0.05 in a fifth. The simple average 
across the eight contrasts showed that at 
the end of 2012, blacks received sentences 
that were 0.173 standardized units higher 
than their white counterparts, a difference 
that was statistically significant at p < 0.01. 
Evidence reported in exhibit 2 indicates that 
these findings are robust to model 
specification. We do not find that black 
females are disadvantaged compared with white females. 
According to the Black x Max Sentence parameter, the disadvantage suffered by blacks 
decreases as the maximum sentence for a guideline cell increases. This does not mean that blacks are 
disadvantaged for minor crimes and advantaged for serious crimes; rather, the statistics imply that the 
disadvantage between blacks and whites narrows as crimes become more serious. 
Table 1 also reports random effects holding the judicial circuit constant.33 Statistical modeling 
                                                          
33 Differences across circuits are large. Averaging across the 14 partitions (including sex offenses), the second 
circuit sentence is an average of 0.46 standard deviation units below the national average and the fifth circuit 
sentences are an average of 0.31 standard deviation units above the national average. That disparity is much larger 
than the racial disparity reported in this study. 
Exhibit 2. Sentencing disparity has increased for black 
males 
Using the preferred model with circuit fixed effects, 
sentencing disparity has increased by an average of 0.173 
standardized units (p < 0.01). Exchanging districts for 
circuits, we estimate that sentencing disparity has 
increased by an average of 0.161 standardized units (p < 
0.01). Dropping both circuits and districts from the model 
specification, sentencing disparity increased by an 
estimated 0.190 standardized units (p < 0.01). Using the 
preferred model, but including age and education in the 
model specification, the increase is 0.168 standardized 
units (p < 0.01). Findings regarding trends in disparity are 
robust to model specification. 
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assumes that judges differ regarding the sentences imposed on white offenders, the sizes of those 
differences are randomly distributed across judges, and that distribution is normal. The variance for that 
distribution is 0.075, which appears to be large in terms of standardized sentences. The confidence 
interval is tight about this estimate. Likewise, judges differ regarding sentences imposed on blacks. The 
variance for that distribution is 0.077, and again, that variance seems large in terms of standardized 
sentences. Observe that the correlation between the random effect across judges for whites and the 
random effect across judges for blacks is very high: 0.808.  
Looking across the 14 strata and converting from variances to standard deviations, on average 
the standard deviation for the random judge effect is 0.36 for whites and 0.40 for blacks (see exhibit 
3). This is evidence of high disparity in general: Judges who impose above average prison terms on black 
offenders tend to impose above average prison terms on white offenders, and judges who impose 
below average prison terms on white offenders tend to impose below average prison terms on black 
offenders. In this regard, sentences are disparate in the sense that similarly situated offenders who have 
committed similar crimes receive sentences that differ depending on the judge who imposes the 
sentence.34 In standard deviation units, the random effects are 15% to 20% larger for females than for 
males, implying that judges disagree more about the sentences to impose on females than the 
                                                          
34 Generalizing this statement is difficult because we could only estimate covariances for four of the regressions. 
This is a practical limitation of working with random effect models. The correlation was close to 0.85 in three 
regressions and closer to 0.6 in one regression. 
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sentences to be imposed on males.  
Although the analysis reported in 
table 1 pertains to a regression using the 
standardized scores for sentences, estimates 
based on these results are readily translated 
back into the original metric of months 
sentenced by reversing the transformation 
represented by equation [7]. We have 
applied this reverse transformation when 
producing the figures reported below.  
5.2.1 Converting findings on disparity 
from standardized units to original units 
Statistical testing shows that the table 1 parameters associated with time interacted with blacks 
(Black x Year Pre-2008 and Black x Year Post-2008) imply positive, statistically significant trends. 
Apparently, blacks have been increasingly disadvantaged over time. The parameters are difficult to 
interpret, but they can be translated into natural units (months) and their implications can be graphed. 
Graphing also allows us to extend findings to other partitions of the data. 
Figure 2 represents trends in racial disparity for the first four partitions of data: Males convicted 
of crimes that do not involve weapons violations, both with and without substantial assistance to the 
government. The horizontal axis in each panel is the year that the sentence was imposed. When we 
translate backwards from standardized units to original units, we have to make the translation for 
specific guideline cells. (The translation first multiplies by the standard deviation of sentences within a 
cell and then adds the mean for that cell.) The translation is reported for maximum guideline sentences 
at the break for the first quartile of cells used in the analysis, for the mean, and at the break for the third 
quartile. For example, in the first panel (males, no drugs or weapons, and no substantial assistance), a 
Exhibit 3. Judges disagree about sentences 
According to the preferred model, when sentencing 
whites, the distribution of judge random effects has a 
standard deviation of 0.36 on average across 12 data 
partitions. When sentencing blacks, the standard 
deviation is 0.40. (There is no change when age and 
education are added to the model.) As expected, when 
district is substituted for circuit, the standard deviations 
for the random effects fall to 0.23 for whites and 0.30 for 
blacks because the districts account for more residual 
variance than do the circuits. Likewise, when neither 
district nor circuit enters the model, the standard 
deviations for judge random effects increase to 0.44 for 
whites and 0.50 for blacks. These patterns are expected 
because circuit fixed effects account for some of the 
residual variance otherwise attributed to judges and 
district fixed effects account for even more of the residual. 
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quarter of offenders were sentenced under guidelines calling for maximum sentences of 33 months or 
less, half were sentenced under guidelines calling for maximum sentences of 46 months or less, and a 
quarter were sentenced under guidelines calling for maximum sentences of 87 months or more. The 
quartile breaks differ across the data partitions.
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Figure 2 – Increases in racial disparity over time for four partitions: Males convicted for non-weapons violations (overall significance p < 0.01) 
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The first two panels appear to show a sharp break at the Gall decision. (We reference panels from left to 
right and then from top to bottom.) We are not inclined to take the break seriously, as it could result 
from our decision to place the knot for the spline at the time of Gall. A different placement might show 
a different pattern, but our principal concern is with the level of disparity at the end of 2012, and the 
estimates at the end of the period should be relatively insensitive to the placement of the knot. All four 
panels agree that disparity increased from 2005 to 2012, although the change is not statistically 
significant in the fourth panel. If we consider all panels jointly, giving each an equal weight in the 
calculations, we find they are jointly significant at p < 0.01. 
The next set of four partitions (figure 3) pertains to males convicted of crimes that involve 
weapons enhancements. Some of these crimes are drug-related and others are not. Again, we 
distinguish between cases where the offender was rewarded for substantial assistance to the 
government and cases where there was no reward for substantial assistance.
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Figure 3 – Increases in racial disparity over time for four partitions: Males convicted of crimes involving weapons violations (overall significance p < 
0.05) 
Changes over time: Weapons 
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The figure shows patterns of increasing racial disparity for offenses that involve weapons enhancement. 
The increases are not statistically significant when offenders receive reductions for substantial 
assistance to the government, but the increases are always positive. If we consider the four trends 
jointly, they are statistically significant at p < 0.05.  
Results for females are different. There are too few cases involving females with weapons 
violations to allow testing. Considering the four offenses without weapons enhancements, one partition 
shows a statistically significant (p < 0.05) trend while the other three do not, and the joint effect is not 
statistically significant. We do not graph the results. Increasing racial disparity in sentencing appears to 
be limited to males. 
Although other factors may have been changing during this same 8-year period, a subsection on 
“evidence of prosecutorial discretion” (see section 5.3) does not find trends in prosecutorial behavior, 
causing us to discount prosecutorial behavior as the cause of increasing disparity. Other explanations 
are plausible, but it seems reasonable to conclude these trends could be attributed to judicially induced 
disparity in the treatment of black offenders, compared to white offenders. 
Some reviewers of an earlier draft were concerned that findings might be sensitive to the choice 
of a linear spline and suggested replacing the linear spline with an alternative approach. The data 
definitely suggest that the trend is nonlinear, so using a simple linear trend would be a misspecification. 
(One of the reviewers performed a reanalysis using the methodology of Ulmer, Light, & Kramer (2011), 
reporting that the trend was positive post-Booker and then appears to have reached a plateau, 
consistent with the spline.) We tried using a polynomial but—as often happens with polynomials—the 
end points seem uninformative and perhaps misleading about the trend as it nears 2012. A 
nonparametric alternative is to substitute dummy variables for every post-Booker year. Figures 4 and 5 
are the exact counterparts to figures 2 and 3, with dummy year variables substituted for the spline. 
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Figure 4 – Increases in racial disparity over time for four partitions: Alternative specification to figure 2 
Changes over time: Males 
No drugs, no substantial assistance No drugs, substantial assistance 
  
Drugs, no substantial assistance Drugs, substantial assistance 
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Figure 5 – Increases in racial disparity over time for four partitions: Alternative specification to figure 3 
Changes over time: Males 
No drugs, no substantial assistance No drugs, substantial assistance 
  
Drugs, no substantial assistance Drugs, substantial assistance 
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Readers can bring their own interpretations to figures 4 and 5. There is considerable random fluctuation 
from year to year, which is why we employed a smoothing technique—linear splines—to provide a 
summary. (We discourage readers from making much of year-to-year changes.) Some of the figures 
suggest why using polynomials can be misleading: There are apparently random spikes in the latter 
years. Our interpretation is that the general trend toward increasing racial disparity seems to reach a 
rough plateau sometime after the Gall decision. The linear splines appear to be reasonably consistent 
with this interpretation. 
5.2.2 Racial disparity across guideline cells 
Allowing the sentences to vary across the guideline cells is of some importance for model 
specification (significant in 5 of 14 partitions), but this finding is not of substantive interest.35 Racial 
disparity is statistically significant at p < 0.01 in 3 of 12 comparisons. We do not consider this to be an 
important finding. The signs of coefficients associated with the race effect vary, and the coefficients are 
statistically significant in only 3 of 12 comparisons. The results are sensitive to model specification. 
Evidence is that standardizing the sentences has been useful for model specification. 
5.2.3 Racial disparity across judges 
Table 1 also reports random-effects parameters. We have already discussed those findings by 
presenting variance estimates in standardized units, and this subsection provides a visual impression 
after converting back to original units. Random effects may be difficult to interpret, so some intuition 
may be useful. The fixed effects (i.e., all of the parameters except the random effects) provide an 
estimate of the average sentence imposed on white and black offenders, conditional on the facts 
surrounding the case. Given that average, we can estimate the amount by which an individual judge 
differs from the average when sentencing black offenders and when sentencing white offenders. These 
estimated differences are the random effects. Subtracting the random effect for a judge when 
                                                          
35 By construction, the mean sentence is zero across the guideline cells. Given the regression specification, the 
statement pertains to the variation in average sentences for whites across the guideline cells. 
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sentencing a white offender from the random effect for a judge when sentencing a black offender 
translates the random effects into a difference score—how much a judge sentences blacks more 
severely than whites. 
The statistical model assumes that the random effects are distributed as bivariate normal. This is 
probably not exactly true, but we assume it is sufficiently approximate that we can graph the implied 
difference scores. By construction, the difference scores are themselves distributed as normal, 
explaining why the graph in figure 6 has the familiar shape of a normal distribution. 
This discussion is focused on three parameters: the variance in judge effects for whites ( )2wσ , 
the variance in judge effects for blacks ( )2bσ , and the correlation in the judge effects for whites and 
blacks ( )wbσ . The variance for the distribution of differences in effects for whites and blacks is
( )wbbw σσσ 222 −+ . Because the analysis was done using standardized sentences, the disagreement 
across judges in sentences for blacks is large,36 but then so too is the disagreement across judges in 
sentences for whites. Furthermore, when we were able to compute the correlation in the effects for 
blacks and whites, that correlation is high. The story is that some judges typically apply relatively harsh 
sentences to both blacks and whites, while other judges typically apply relatively lenient sentences to 
both blacks and whites. This is disparity but it is not necessarily racial disparity. 
When we performed the analysis with all of the data (as reported previously), we discovered 
that the covariance estimate was unstable. We could improve the estimates by limiting the data to 
judges who sentenced at least five offenders. The results we present below pertain to the random 
effects after imposing that data limitation. Even with this data restriction, we could not always estimate 
a covariance reliably. We only present figures when a covariance estimate was available. Figure 6 
                                                          
36 The analysis reported in table 1 was based on transformed sentences, where the distribution of sentences within 
a guideline cell had a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The judge random effects are scaled according 
to these unitary standardized deviations, suggesting that the random effects are large. 
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represents the variance for males convicted of non-weapons violations. Figure 7 is similar but pertains 
to females. 
Figures 6 and 7 aid in interpreting regression results.  For reasons already discussed, we draw 
the distribution of the difference scores for three levels of guideline cells. These levels are at the 25th, 
median, and 75th percentiles of the maximum sentence lengths of the guideline cells. For each judge, we 
compute the difference in predicted sentences for blacks and whites for the three sentence lengths. 
The two figures depict the extent of disagreement across judges regarding the sentencing of white and 
black offenders. The horizontal axis reports the difference in months of the predicted difference in 
sentence lengths for black and white offenders for each judge. The vertical axis reports the density of 
the distribution. The estimates are highly inferential and intended to approximate and illustrate the 
extent to which federal judges disagree about sentences by race. 
By construction, the judge random effects are centered on zero. The differences in random 
effects will also be centered on zero. However, for purposes of data visualization, we have centered 
them on the mean differences in sentence for black and white offenders. 
Thus, for males, we observe that the centers of the distributions are all above zero. Blacks receive longer 
sentences than whites for the average judge; for females, the distributions are centered near zero 
because female white and black offenders receive similar terms. The distributions are approximations, 
but if we took them literally, we would conclude that judges tend to sentence blacks more severely than 
they sentence whites. For some judges, the sentencing disparity seems especially large, while for others 
it seems substantively insignificant. For a few judges, blacks appeared to be advantaged compared to 
whites, and while this may be true, the advantage typically appears to be small, and it may occur 
because we have used the bivariate normal as a useful approximation of reality. 
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Figure 6 – Variation in racial sentencing disparity across judges for males convicted of non-weapons violations 
Differences in judge distributions: Males  
No drugs, no substantial assistance No drugs, substantial assistance 
  
Drugs, no substantial assistance Drugs, substantial assistance 
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Figure 7 – Variation in racial sentencing disparity across judges for females convicted of nonweapons violations 
Differences in judge distributions: Females 
No drugs, no substantial assistance No drugs, substantial assistance 
  
Drugs, no substantial assistance Drugs, substantial assistance 
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If judges sentenced blacks and whites to equivalent terms, conditional on the facts surrounding 
the case, the distributions of the difference in sentences for blacks and whites would collapse to zero. 
This does not happen. (Table 1 provides a test of the null hypothesis that these distributions have a 
variance of zero, meaning that they collapse to zero. The test rejects the null, although we recognize 
that the estimated variance has a large confidence interval, so there is some uncertainty about the 
spread of these distributions.) It seems likely that black and white offenders differ systematically in ways 
that cause judges to sentence them differently and, if we could observe those differences, the 
sentencing differences might be appropriate under the rule of law. However, that does not explain why 
some judges sentence blacks especially severely compared to whites. Unobserved, systematic 
differences between whites and blacks cannot account for the fact that the average difference in 
sentences for black and white offenders varies across judges.  
5.2.4 Increases in disparity: Variance about the guidelines 
We re-estimated the regression discussed previously without the judge random effects. From 
the regression, we estimated the squared residual, equal to 2ijke in the notation used earlier.37 Then we 
regressed the squared residual on the linear splines representing post-Booker trends and onto the 
maximum sentence specified by the guidelines. Table 2 shows the results of repeating this exercise for 
the 12 partitions of the data. 
                                                          
37 Our intent is to examine changes in the variance of the regression. 
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Table 2 – An estimated skedastic function based on residuals 
  Males, no weapons, no sex offenders 
  No drug, no SA No drug, SA Drug, no SA Drug, SA 
  Estimate Std err p-value Estimate Std err p-value Estimate Std err p-value Estimate Std err p-value 
Skedastic function             
year_pregall 0.358 0.187 0.055 0.330 0.177 0.063 0.182 0.156 0.242 0.401 0.143 0.005 
year_postgall 0.300 0.076 0.000 0.134 0.070 0.054 0.400 0.063 0.000 0.113 0.060 0.059 
Observations 76405   10829   62650   25380   
Increase 2005–2012 0.322 0.059 <0.001 0.208 0.056 <0.001 0.318 0.049 <0.001 0.221 0.045 <0.001 
             
  Females, no weapons, no sex offenders 
  No drug, no SA No drug, SA Drug, no SA Drug, SA 
  Estimate Std err p-value Estimate Std err p-value Estimate Std err p-value Estimate Std err p-value 
Skedastic function             
year_pregall 0.512 0.450 0.256 0.348 0.262 0.184 -0.040 0.231 0.863 0.263 0.149 0.079 
year_postgall 0.293 0.169 0.083 0.157 0.100 0.118 0.359 0.090 0.000 0.060 0.061 0.326 
Observations 9001   1818   9501   5737   
Increase 2005–2012 0.375 0.142 0.008 0.228 0.082 0.005 0.209 0.071 0.003 0.136 0.047 0.004 
             
  Weapons offenders 
  No drug, no SA No drug, SA Drug, no SA Drug, SA 
  Estimate Std err p-value Estimate Std err p-value Estimate Std err p-value Estimate Std err p-value 
Skedastic function             
year_pregall -0.282 0.256 0.271 -0.526 0.349 0.132 -0.522 0.219 0.017 -0.070 0.178 0.694 
year_postgall 0.161 0.102 0.114 0.205 0.141 0.145 0.053 0.094 0.571 0.091 0.076 0.231 
Observations 15035   3462   14500   6771   
Increase 2005–2012 -0.005 0.082 0.952 -0.069 0.112 0.539 -0.162 0.070 0.021 0.031 0.058 0.597 
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As noted previously, we can estimate how dispersion has increased about the average as of 
2012 by weighting and summing year_pregall and year_postgall parameters. Standard error calculations 
are provided in the table. Except for the weapons violations, the trends are toward higher dispersion 
and all trends are statistically significant at p < 0.05 or better. Post-Booker, we previously saw that 
sentencing has become more lenient. We now see that it has become more disparate. Excluding 
weapons violations, similarly situated offenders convicted of similar crimes are increasingly sentenced 
differently. As a robustness check, we find that the qualitative patterns (and tests of statistical 
significance) do not change when district fixed effects are included in the model. 
5.3 Evidence of prosecutorial discretion 
Because prosecutors exercise wide discretion to charge and bargain with offenders, 
prosecutorial discretion may be exercised to disadvantage blacks. That possibility is difficult to discount 
using FJSP data because FJSP data do not provide a rich description of offenses and offenders at the 
time prosecution is initiated. The full story may not emerge before a federal probation officer writes a 
presentence investigation report based on a narrative of the crime provided by a law enforcement 
source, a criminal record check, and interviews with the offender and his or her associates. 
Furthermore, the current version of FJSP data provides limited means to link data from the Executive 
Office of U.S. Attorneys with sentenced offenders, so any study using Executive Office data necessarily 
works with a selected dataset. 
Even if U.S. Attorneys treat blacks differently than whites, it is nevertheless difficult to discount 
the findings reported in the previous section. If federal prosecutors discriminate against blacks, and if 
judges could somehow recognize that differential treatment,38 we might expect federal judges to 
                                                          
38 The federal probation officer prepares a presentence investigation report for the judge. The report includes a 
description of the crime according to case files, the offender’s criminal history according to a records check, and 
interviews with the offender and his or her associates. In theory, then, the judge could form an opinion about the 
case that is independent of the rendition communicated by the prosecution and defense. However, others have 
reported that judges are typically deferential (Commission, 2011; Commission, 2012). 
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partially rectify the injustice by being more lenient with black offenders than with white offenders, 
conditional on the guideline cell. That relative leniency is the opposite of what we find. Rather, if federal 
prosecutors discriminate against blacks, federal judges appear to reinforce discrimination by disparate 
sentences. It is possible that federal prosecutors discriminate in favor of black offenders and we are 
simply estimating corrective action by federal judges (although we cannot prove otherwise, this 
explanation seems unlikely and we do not pursue it). 
Figure 2 shows trends toward increasing disparity. If prosecutorial behavior explained those 
trends, we would expect to see coincident trends in prosecutorial behavior. Evidence reported in the 
following subsections suggests otherwise. 
5.3.1 Facts surrounding the case 
Table 3 shows summary statistics reflecting changes in prosecutorial behavior. It is possible that 
prosecutors have increasingly manipulated offenders’ criminal history scores. If so, we should be able to 
observe changes over time, and we are especially interested in determining whether blacks are 
increasingly advantaged or disadvantaged, as this may explain what we are observing about trends in 
sentencing disparity. Table 3 shows seven indicators of prosecutorial behavior. We are interested in 
whether those indicators change materially over time. 
Table 3 – Trends in prosecutorial behavior 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 Criminal history (mean by race and year) 
Black 3.00 3.08 3.15 3.20 3.22 3.21 3.22 3.21 3.13 3.11 
White 2.19 2.29 2.26 2.24 2.28 2.26 2.28 2.27 2.22 2.23 
 Offense level (mean by race and year) 
Black 20.57 20.46 21.21 21.30 21.43 21.44 21.37 21.18 20.93 21.30 
White 17.79 17.86 18.61 18.81 18.92 18.93 19.08 19.32 19.67 20.16 
 Acceptance of responsibility (average level reduction by race and year) 
Black -2.40 -2.39 -2.41 -2.44 -2.48 -2.49 -2.49 -2.49 -2.52 -2.54 
White -2.42 -2.42 -2.44 -2.47 -2.49 -2.51 -2.53 -2.54 -2.55 -2.60 
 Substantial assistance (proportion by race and year) 
Black 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.19 
White 0.21 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 
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Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 Government-sponsored reductions (proportion by race and year) 
Black - - 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.06 
White - - 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 
 Conviction by trial (proportion by race and year) 
Black 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 
White 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
 Imposition of a mandatory minimum (proportion by race and year) 
Black   0.257 0.277 0.299 0.299 0.294 0.282 0.263 0.263 
White   0.157 0.153 0.143 0.145 0.149 0.149 0.150 0.157 
Evidence shows that blacks have higher criminal history scores than do whites, but we do not 
observe a strong difference in the trends for whites and blacks (table 3). Blacks tend to have higher 
offense level scores. We see some narrowing in the difference in the scores for whites and blacks, but 
overall we do not see large trends in the offense severity score and certainly no trends that 
disadvantage blacks. 
The original commission considered acceptance-of-responsibility adjustments as a substitute for 
plea bargaining. As table 3 shows, blacks receive slightly smaller acceptance-of-responsibility 
adjustments. (The numbers reflect the average number of reductions in the offense level, so the more 
negative the reduction, the greater the benefit to the offender.) There has been a modest increase in 
the size of acceptance-of-responsibility adjustments, but the increase has not been large and both 
whites and blacks have benefited to the same degree. 
Prosecutors exercise choice over petitioning the court for substantial assistance departures. As 
shown in table 3, blacks and whites receive substantial assistance departures at about the same rate. 
Over time, the rate has been constant for blacks and has decreased for whites. However, these changes 
have not been large. Prosecutors also exercise choice over petitioning the court for other downward 
departures. We see modest trends in other government-sponsored departures, and blacks and whites 
receive other government-sponsored departures at about the same rates. Data for government-
sponsored departures below the guideline range are only available for cases sentenced since the Booker 
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v. United States decision. Therefore, no data appear for 2003 and 2004. Continuing this logic, table 3 
also shows the proportion of cases involving the imposition of a mandatory minimum, regardless of the 
offense associated with the minimum (i.e., for a drug offense or a weapons offense).39 It shows that 
blacks are more likely to receive mandatory minimums, and it apparently shows random fluctuations. 
Overall, the proportion of cases where a mandatory minimum was imposed has not changed 
significantly over time for either blacks or whites. 
Few offenders demand a trial, but blacks may be more likely to demand trials if they are 
disadvantaged by plea agreements. Blacks are convicted at trial rather than by plea more frequently 
than are whites, but the differences are not large (because trials are infrequent) and there is no 
evidence that the decreasing frequency of trials is disadvantaging black offenders. 
The evidence does not show that prosecutorial behavior changed from 2003 through 2012. The 
relative constancy of prosecutorial practices cannot explain the trends reported in figure 2. 
5.3.2 Gaming drug amounts near mandatory minimums 
The evidence presented in the previous subsection pertained to trends in indicators of 
prosecutorial discretion. In this subsection, we examine charging decisions with respect to drug 
amounts. This is not based on trend analysis, but it is nevertheless informative about prosecutorial 
decision-making. 
Drug offenses provide one venue for finding evidence of whether prosecutors have exercised 
discretion to the disadvantage of blacks. Mandatory minimums for drug violators are triggered by the 
amount of drugs that were trafficked. For example, when an offender is convicted of trafficking 500 or 
more grams of cocaine, he or she is subject to a mandatory minimum sentence, absent some mitigating 
considerations. If there were evidence of discretion favoring one group over others around a statutory 
                                                          
39 We used the USSC variables MAND1 to MAND6 to determine whether any mandatory minimum sentence was 
imposed in the case. These variables are only available since 2005. 
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mandatory minimum, we would expect to observe larger percentages of favored groups having drug 
amounts just shy of the minimum, compared to the other groups. Our analysis suggests that this is not 
happening. 
We look for evidence of prosecutorial manipulation in recorded drug weights for drug trafficking 
cases. Specifically, we look to see whether blacks are more likely than whites to be above a mandatory 
minimum threshold for drug cases, with amounts near a threshold that triggers the application of 
mandatory minimum sentencing laws. If blacks are systematically disadvantaged, then blacks should be 
more likely than whites to be above a mandatory minimum threshold. We limit this investigation to the 
six major drugs that make up the overwhelming majority of sentenced cases: cocaine, crack, heroin, 
marijuana, mixture methamphetamine, and pure methamphetamine. 
Figure 8 provides an example based on powder cocaine. We have included Hispanics in the 
figure, so the categories are non-Hispanic whites (white), non-Hispanic blacks or African Americans 
(black), and Hispanics. This figure shows three distributions of drug amounts for offenders in a broadly 
defined range (+/- 100 grams) around the lower mandatory minimum threshold amount for cocaine 
(500 grams). For this figure, offenders have been grouped into discrete bins spanning approximately 10 
grams (i.e., 480 to 489.99, 490 to 499.99, 500 to 509.99). The horizontal axis shows the grams of cocaine 
associated with the offense, and the vertical axis shows the percentages of offenders within each 
grouping that fall into each bin. The bins themselves have been mapped to a smoothed line to aid in 
visualization.  
 63 
Federal Sentencing Disparity, 2005–2012  
Figure 8  – Distribution of offenders within 100 grams of the 500-gram mandatory minimum threshold, by 
race and ethnicity  
 
Five hundred grams of cocaine is one-half kilogram, and perhaps this is a standard unit of transaction, 
explaining the concentration around 500 grams. A more likely explanation is that prosecutors are most 
interested in establishing that offenders have transacted at least 500 grams, which triggers a mandatory 
minimum, and that prosecutors have little incentive to demonstrate that offenders have transacted 
somewhat more than this amount until the transaction reaches about 5 kilograms, which triggers the 
next application of a mandatory minimum.  
This figure depicts a divergence between the three racial or ethnic groups on the interval 
between 480 and 500 grams and suggests that, relative to whites, blacks and Hispanics are more likely 
to fall just below the 500-gram cutoff. The differences are not large, however, implying that during the 
post-Booker period, prosecutors have not discriminated against blacks when establishing that a case 
meets the mandatory minimum threshold. 
To formally test for differences by race, we estimate a linear regression that models the 
probability of falling above a threshold amount, controlling for offender criminal history, education, sex, 
substantial assistance to the prosecution, sentencing year, whether the case went to trial, and circuit 
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fixed effects. We estimate separate models for each drug and each mandatory minimum threshold 
amount. In addition, the sample is restricted to cases where the safety valve provision was not applied. 
Based on drug statute 21 U.S.C. § 841, we identify two thresholds for each drug—low and high—defined 
in table D1 in appendix D. Overall, we do not find strong evidence to support the argument that blacks 
face systematic prosecutorial discrimination. Rather, racial inequities around minimum thresholds 
appear more idiosyncratic or drug-specific. Table 4 shows the result of our estimation. 
Table 4 – Conditional differences (male and female) 
Differences in probability of being above the cutoff, relative to whites 
 
White Black Hispanic White Black Hispanic 
Lower Upper 
Cocaine - -10.0 ** -14.3 *** - 6.4 -8.7 ** 
Crack - 4.7  12.0 ** - -4.1 -3.0  
Heroin - -7.1  -13.3  - -14.3 -11.3  
Marijuana - 24.1 *** 5.1  - -9.9 -8.7  
Meth (mix) - 7.3  0.2  - 17.8 4.3  
Meth (pure) - -25.2  -0.1  - -3.7 -9.6  
Notes: ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
This table shows the estimated difference in the probability of being just above a threshold amount by 
race, drug, and threshold. For cocaine, it shows that blacks have a probability that is 0.10 lower than 
whites to be above the 500-gram threshold, but not statistically more or less likely to be above the 
5,000-gram threshold (i.e., the next step in the mandatory minimum gradient). Hispanics are also less 
likely than whites to be above either the 500- or 5,000-gram threshold. For crack, heroin, and 
methamphetamine, no strong differences emerge. For marijuana, blacks are more likely to be above the 
lower (1,000 kilogram) threshold, with no detectable differences for Hispanics. Based on these results, 
there is no obvious pattern of preference that favors or disadvantages blacks. 
In addition to the results presented here, there are other aspects of the data that warrant 
further discussion and from which we conduct additional sensitivity analysis. The first is that drug 
amounts are not always recorded as exact weights or amounts in the sentencing data. Instead, amounts 
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are often recorded as ranges. We find that this occurs roughly 25% of the time for drug trafficking cases 
overall, although this percentage varies depending on the drug type. Table D2 in appendix D shows the 
percentage of cases in which no exact drug amount is reported, stratified by drug type and race 
category. Given the sizeable number of such cases, we would not want to exclude them from analysis. 
However, because the reported ranges themselves are relatively wide, we cannot identify offenders as 
being close to the thresholds. Our solution is to analyze these cases as a separate group.  
For this group, we find that reported ranges generally (1) do not overlap thresholds and (2) 
often use threshold amounts as range boundaries. Given this, we select and analyze offenders with 
recorded ranges bounded by an amount that is also a threshold cutoff (e.g., as in a range of cocaine 
amount [from > 0 to 500 grams or from 500 to 1,500 grams]) and test whether black offenders are more 
likely to be strictly at or above the threshold, relative to whites. The specification for this test is identical 
to the estimation performed using the exact weights discussed earlier (i.e., estimating a linear 
probability model using covariates, such as criminal history, sex, race and circuit, and separate models 
for each drug). Table D3 in appendix D reports the results of these estimations. This table shows 
estimates that are largely consistent with our earlier findings. And while there are some differences 
from our earlier results, some of these differences may simply be due to chance. We find no discernable 
evidence of systematic bias in prosecutorial practice.  
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6.0 Conclusions 
At least since Marvin Frankel’s 1973 book, Criminal Sentences; Law without Order, was 
published, sentencing disparity has been a concern of federal justice administration. That concern led 
Congress to pass the Comprehensive Crime Control Act in 1984, which created the USSC. The duly 
appointed commission crafted the first Federal Sentencing Guidelines in 1987. For decades, scholars 
have debated whether the guidelines have reduced disparity; with the Booker decision, which rendered 
the guidelines advisory, scholars have argued whether disparity has subsequently increased or 
decreased, and they have debated whether a return to some form of mandatory guidelines would 
benefit or harm justice administration. 
Our study does not attempt to answer the question of whether the guidelines increased or 
decreased disparity, whether the Booker decision increased or decreased disparity, and whether a new 
mandatory guideline system that passed Supreme Court scrutiny would improve justice administration. 
Commissioned by BJS, our study has proposed a way of studying sentencing disparity that helps answer 
questions about the level of disparity and post-Booker trends. The methodology could be extended to 
study the causal effects of Booker, although the grounds for making causal statements in a non-
experimental setting are treacherous. 
Like earlier studies, our study treats the guideline cell as the anchor point for any further 
analysis of sentencing patterns. Using data transformations that standardize sentences within each 
guideline cell, we have introduced a regression-based methodology that allows us to make summary 
statements about how racial disparity varies across guideline cells and over time. By using a linear 
random effects regression model, we are able to make summary statements about how racial disparity 
varies across judges. We do not claim this is the only valid methodology for studying disparity, and for 
some research questions it may not even be the best; however, for the questions posed by BJS, this 
methodology has strong appeal. 
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The methodology is solidly within the tradition of studying disparity, given the facts known at 
the time of sentencing, but some researchers claim that locating a study of disparity this late in the 
judicial process ignores disparity in prosecutorial decision-making. While we do not necessarily find this 
counterargument compelling, we have dealt with the critique indirectly by showing that prosecutorial 
discretion does not appear to have changed much since 2005 (the beginning of our study), although we 
find trends toward increased racial disparity between 2005 and 2012. These trends are likely 
attributable to judicial behavior, not prosecutorial behavior. This conclusion is strengthened by evidence 
from the estimated random effects of considerable inter-judge differences in the sentences for white 
and black offenders. 
What we find is that black males receive harsher sentences than white males after accounting 
for the facts surrounding the case, and we also find that the sentencing disparity has grown over the 8 
years since Booker. We find that females receive sentences that are less harsh than their male 
counterparts, but curiously we find that black and white females receive similar sentences. Something 
other than skin color and racial prejudice per se is driving these results. 
We find it difficult to attribute racial disparity to skin color alone. While it is an obvious 
distinction, in the United States race is bundled with a large number of unobserved characteristics. We 
have observed that blacks are more concentrated within circuits that impose harsh sentences compared 
with more lenient circuits. It is possible that blacks receive the same sentences as whites within every 
circuit, but that blacks receive harsher sentences than whites nationally. After we account for these 
circuit differences, racial disparity remains, but the point is that race is correlated with other 
characteristics that may account for different sentences among whites and blacks. For example, we 
know that blacks sentenced in the federal justice system are, on average, less educated than are whites 
sentenced in the federal justice system. Therefore, if judges take education into account (along with 
correlates such as earnings and demeanor), then racial disparity could be explained by factors that 
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might be deemed to be reasonable desiderata when imposing sentences. A study of disparity is not a 
study of bias. Our study cannot get at the ultimate reasons why black males receive harsher sentences 
than do white males, after accounting for the facts surrounding the case. 
We are concerned that racial disparity has increased over time since Booker. Perhaps judges, 
who feel increasingly emancipated from their guidelines restrictions, are improving justice 
administration by incorporating relevant but previously ignored factors into their sentencing calculus, 
even if this improvement disadvantages black males as a class. But in a society that sees intentional and 
unintentional racial bias in many areas of social and economic activity, these trends are a warning sign. 
It is further distressing that judges disagree about the relative sentences for white and black males 
because those disagreements cannot be so easily explained by sentencing-relevant factors that vary 
systematically between black and white males. (The judge-specific effects take random variation into 
account.) We take the random effect as strong evidence of disparity in the imposition of sentences for 
white and black males.  
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Appendix A: Mechanics of guidelines 
The United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual (2013) provides instructions for 
applying the guidelines. These instructions are detailed, and interested readers should consult them in 
the original. Our current intention is to provide an overview. 
The guidelines stipulate a sentencing table that has 43 rows and 6 columns defining 258 cells. 
The applicable row is determined by the offense seriousness and the applicable column is determined 
by the offender’s criminal history. Calculations required to identify the row and column are described 
below. The cells are clustered into four zones. A probation term is authorized in zones A and B, but a 
probation term in zone B must be accompanied by an alternative to confinement, such as home 
detention. A prison term is required in zones C and D. 
The sentencing table cell specifies the length of the prison term. For example, an offense level of 
16 and a criminal history category of IV require a prison term between 33 and 41 months. Even when 
the guidelines were mandatory, a judge could depart upward or downward from the stipulated range. 
Now that the guidelines are advisory, there is no obligation to adhere to the range. We discuss 
departure reasons later in this appendix; first we review how the guidelines establish the offense level. 
Offense level 
Determination of offense level begins with the basic offense. For example, chapter 2 in the 
guidelines defines an aggravated assault. A judge who is sentencing an offender convicted of an 
aggravated assault starts with a baseline offense level of 14 and considers other aspects of the case. 
Instructions are— 
• If the crime involved more than minimal planning, add 2 points, increasing the offense level 
from 14 to 16. 
• Add 3 to 5 points depending on the nature of the weapon (if any) and how it was used. 
• Add 3 to 10 points depending on the extent of injury. 
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• Add 2 points if the crime was motivated by profit. 
• Add 2 points if certain statutory provisions are met. 
The guidelines provide detailed instructions and definitions. 
Other offenses have different baseline offense levels and recognize case elements that 
distinguish cases based on severity within an offense type. Points for property crimes are determined by 
the dollar loss. Points for drug crimes are determined by the type and amount of drugs bought or sold. 
Offense categories sometimes overlap, and the guidelines provide cross-references to resolve 
ambiguities. 
Some elements of criminal cases are common to multiple types of cases. These elements are 
identified in chapter 3, where they are called adjustments, and consist of five categories: 
• Victim adjustments (e.g., an enhancement for a vulnerable victim, as defined by the guidelines). 
• The offender’s role in the offense (e.g., points are added if the offender leads a criminal 
enterprise, and points are subtracted if the offender was a minimal participant). 
• Points are added if the offender obstructed or impeded the administration of justice. 
• Offenders are often convicted of multiple counts for the same type of offense or for different 
offenses. The guidelines provide rules for imposing a sentence given multiple counts of 
conviction. 
• The guidelines apply what they call “acceptance of responsibility provisions.” If the offender 
clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his or her offense, the offense level is 
decreased by 2 levels. Under some conditions, on motion of the government stating that the 
offender has assisted authorities in the investigation or prosecution of his or her misconduct by 
timely notifying authorities of an intention to enter a guilty plea, the offense level is decreased 
by 1 additional level. 
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Criminal history category 
Chapter 4 provides rules for determining the criminal history category. This chapter applies 
points to the offender’s criminal record, taking into account prior sentences and whether the instant 
crime was done while the offender was under community supervision. The criminal history score makes 
special provisions for career criminals and criminal livelihoods. 
Departures 
Using the offense level from chapter 3 and the criminal history category from chapter 4, 
calculations identify the guideline cell. The guidelines sometimes use the term heartland to mean the 
guidelines capture most of the elements of the offense and offender. As a result, most sentences should 
be imposed consistent with the guideline cell. The guidelines prohibit departures under some conditions 
and allow departures for others. In fact, because the guidelines are now voluntary, there is great 
latitude for departures. Some latitude for departures is built into the guidelines, and its presence needs 
to be recognized by the study of disparity—a point made below. 
Mandatory minimum sentences 
Federal criminal codes specify maximum sentences for all crimes. For example, a code might 
specify that an offender can serve 0 to 5 years if convicted for a count of larceny. There is no minimum 
prison term. Other federal criminal codes—especially for drug violations—specify both a minimum and a 
maximum. For example, if someone is convicted of distributing X grams of cocaine, the code may specify 
that the sentence is between 2 and 5 years. The guidelines might then require a sentence between 2 
and 2½ years. The minimum sentence sets a lower limit on the guidelines and on any legitimate 
sentence. 
However, federal law (18 U.S.C. 3553(f)(1)-(5)) allows the court to sentence below the mandatory 
minimum when the following hold: 
• The offender has no more than 1 criminal history point. 
• He or she did not use violence or credible threats. 
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• There was neither death nor serious bodily injury. 
• The offender was neither an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of a criminal enterprise. 
• The offender revealed all known information about the crime. 
Provided the minimum sentence is 5 years or more, the minimum guidelines range may be reduced, but 
no lower than level 17. 
Substantial assistance 
The sentencing judge is able to depart downward on a motion by the government that the 
offender “…has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person 
who has committed an offense…” Commentary in the guidelines instructs: “Substantial weight should be 
given to the government’s evaluation of the extent of the defendant’s assistance, particularly where the 
extent and value of the assistance are difficult to ascertain.” Government-initiated downward 
departures are frequent. 
Warranted departures 
While the guidelines are intended to cover most circumstances, the Commission indicates that the 
sentencing judge may confront situations where the circumstances faced by the court are so unusual 
that applying the guidelines would be an injustice. In those cases, the sentencing judge can depart from 
the guidelines provided he or she provides an explanation. The guidelines also provide policy statements 
identifying special circumstances when a departure would apply. For example, if a victim or victims 
suffered psychological injury much more serious than that normally resulting from commission of the 
offense, the court may increase the sentence above the authorized guidelines range. In addition, the 
guidelines offer numerous examples of when a departure would be appropriate. 
Prohibited departures 
The guidelines identify factors that cannot be taken into account when departing from the 
guidelines range. A judge cannot base a sentence on race, sex, national origin, religion, and 
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socioeconomic circumstances. A judge cannot reconsider the weighting of factors, such as acceptance of 
responsibility and role in the offense, that are already incorporated into the guidelines. 
Characteristics of the offender 
Chapter 5, part H, discusses some specific characteristics of offenders that may not be taken 
into account at the time of sentencing. Referring to the Sentencing Reform Act, according to the 
guidelines manual: 
First, the act directs the Commission to ensure that the guidelines and policy statements "are 
entirely neutral" as to five characteristics—race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic 
status. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(d). 
Second, the act directs the Commission to consider whether 11 specific offender characteristics, 
"among others," have any relevance to the nature, extent, place of service, or other aspects of an 
appropriate sentence, and to take them into account in the guidelines and policy statements, only 
to the extent that they do have relevance. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(d). 
Third, the act directs the Commission to ensure that the guidelines and policy statements, in 
recommending a term of imprisonment or length of a term of imprisonment, reflect the "general 
inappropriateness" of considering five of those characteristics—education, vocational skills, 
employment record, family ties and responsibilities, and community ties. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(e). 
Fourth, the act also directs the sentencing court, in determining the particular sentence to be 
imposed, to consider, among other factors, "the history and characteristics of the defendant." See 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). 
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According to the Commission:  
The Supreme Court has emphasized that the advisory guideline system should "continue to move 
sentencing in Congress’ preferred direction, helping to avoid excessive sentencing disparities 
while maintaining flexibility sufficient to individualize sentences where necessary. See United 
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264-65 (2005). Although the court must consider "the history and 
characteristics of the defendant" among other factors, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), in order to avoid 
unwarranted sentencing disparities the court should not give them excessive weight. Generally, 
the most appropriate use of specific offender characteristics is to consider them not as a reason 
for a sentence outside the applicable guideline range but for other reasons, such as in determining 
the sentence within the applicable guideline range, the type of sentence (e.g., probation or 
imprisonment) within the sentencing options available for the applicable Zone on the Sentencing 
Table, and various other aspects of an appropriate sentence. To avoid unwarranted sentencing 
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct, 
see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6), 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B), the guideline range, which reflects the 
defendant’s criminal conduct and the defendant’s criminal history, should continue to be "the 
starting point and the initial benchmark." Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007). 
Accordingly, the purpose of this part is to provide sentencing courts with a framework for 
addressing specific offender characteristics in a reasonably consistent manner. Using such a framework 
in a uniform manner will help "secure nationwide consistency" (see Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 
(2007)), "avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities" (see 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B), 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6)), 
"provide certainty and fairness" (see 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B)), and "promote respect for the law" (see 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)). 
The Commission identified several offender characteristics regarding which sentencing judges 
may have dissenting views. The Commission deemed that age may be relevant but considered the 
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situation where the frail may not require prison. Education and vocational skills are considered 
irrelevant, unless they are pertinent to the crime. Mental and emotional conditions may be relevant but 
only in extreme circumstances. Similar to age, physical condition may be relevant. Drug and alcohol 
dependence is ordinarily not a reason for a departure, unless it accomplishes a specific treatment 
purpose. Employment is ordinarily irrelevant. Family ties and responsibilities are not ordinarily relevant, 
although the Commission makes exceptions for loss of caretaking and financial support. 
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Appendix B: Detailed findings for sentencing disparity – U.S. citizens 
This appendix includes tables and figures pertaining to the sentencing of U.S. citizens. Some of these 
tables and figures appear in the main text with summaries. 
 
Table B.1 – Number of observations for each guideline cell - Citizens 
  Criminal history category 
Offense level I II III IV V VI 
1             
2             
3           10 
4             
5           151 
6           491 
7         448 669 
8         339 486 
9       252 180 287 
10     2,233 1,070 704 998 
11       374 282 498 
12     2,934 1,827 1,232 1,600 
13   2,474 3,075 1,839 1,110 1,732 
14   582 648 369 230 827 
15   2,310 2,783 1,530 984 1,326 
16   582 666 368 208 300 
17   2,147 3,753 2,800 1,784 2,144 
18 3,388 541 618 333 224 313 
19 7,085 1,784 2,571 1,662 1,068 1,405 
20 3,045 627 776 506 275 334 
21 10,350 1,961 3,198 2,609 1,886 2,979 
22 2,961 510 680 468 280 463 
23 8,497 3,373 4,827 2,948 1,916 2,246 
24 3,432 594 740 493 321 587 
25 6,213 2,430 3,126 1,917 1,182 1,553 
26 2,862 725 875 482 288 506 
27 7,616 1,648 2,215 1,349 833 970 
28 2,761 577 656 337 221 298 
29 5,245 2,481 3,467 1,868 1,058 5,138 
30 2,402 424 495 774 546 1,696 
31 3,674 1,680 2,210 1,283 767 6,292 
32 1,425 381 495 228 163 745 
33 2,818 934 1,215 824 459 866 
34 1,473 373 452 215 159 5,433 
35 1,566 710 929 438 296 866 
36 700 209 267 158 86 156 
37 1,427 361 411 217 140 1,046 
38 602 187 229 142 83 219 
39 501 127 145 74 40 118 
40 462 113 179 111 85 199 
41 287 71 98 69 34 102 
42 316 79 107 47 47 96 
43 742 161 225 148 116 258 
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Data partition: Males, no weapons offenses, no sex offenders 
Table B.2 – Parameter estimates from mixed models: Males 
 
No drugs, no substantial 
assistance 
No drugs, substantial 
assistance 
Drugs, no substantial 
assistance Drugs, substantial assistance 
Variable Est Std err p Est Std err p Est Std err p Est Std err p 
Year x Pre-Gall -0.246 0.083 0.003 0.005 0.179 0.978 0.179 0.105 0.089 0.255 0.125 0.041 
Year x Post-Gall -0.207 0.038 <0.001 -0.140 0.075 0.061 -0.496 0.051 <0.001 -0.330 0.058 <0.001 
Race/Ethnicity: Non-Hispanic black -0.031 0.033 0.354 -0.139 0.090 0.122 0.039 0.043 0.360 0.088 0.055 0.112 
Race/Ethnicity: Hispanic 0.028 0.044 0.523 0.044 0.143 0.761 0.151 0.041 <0.001 0.282 0.059 <0.001 
Race/Ethnicity: Non-Hispanic other 0.011 0.103 0.914 -0.190 0.213 0.374 0.229 0.102 0.025 0.130 0.114 0.256 
Black x Year x Pre-Gall 0.446 0.111 <0.001 0.675 0.289 0.020 0.164 0.130 0.205 0.077 0.167 0.645 
Hispanic x Year x Pre-Gall -0.065 0.152 0.669 0.095 0.455 0.834 -0.246 0.132 0.062 -0.190 0.195 0.329 
Other x Year x Pre-Gall 0.090 0.331 0.785 0.869 0.709 0.220 -0.459 0.319 0.151 -0.154 0.344 0.655 
Black x Year x Post-Gall -0.033 0.047 0.480 0.035 0.114 0.760 0.143 0.058 0.013 0.080 0.076 0.296 
Hispanic x Year x Post-Gall 0.176 0.065 0.007 -0.071 0.160 0.659 0.250 0.068 <0.001 0.060 0.084 0.477 
Other x Year x Post-Gall -0.028 0.135 0.837 -0.292 0.276 0.289 0.139 0.153 0.363 0.111 0.206 0.590 
Max Sentence in Guideline Cell -0.054 0.050 0.278 0.154 0.093 0.098 -0.301 0.054 <0.001 0.046 0.059 0.432 
Black x Max Sentence -0.213 0.062 0.001 -0.080 0.139 0.563 0.044 0.061 0.474 -0.110 0.075 0.140 
Hispanic x Max Sentence -0.156 0.091 0.089 -0.005 0.185 0.979 -0.039 0.070 0.573 -0.223 0.085 0.009 
Other x Max Sentence 0.493 0.140 <0.001 0.255 0.290 0.380 -0.348 0.182 0.056 0.033 0.223 0.882 
Sentence is a new conviction 0.158 0.019 <0.001 0.308 0.192 0.108 0.270 0.023 <0.001 0.448 0.167 0.007 
CH Points: Category 1 0.078 0.011 <0.001 0.051 0.017 0.003 0.045 0.007 <0.001 0.055 0.010 <0.001 
CH Points: Category 2 0.035 0.011 0.002 0.031 0.031 0.323 0.039 0.011 <0.001 0.070 0.013 <0.001 
CH Points: Category 3 0.045 0.012 <0.001 0.043 0.027 0.120 0.051 0.016 0.001 0.046 0.013 0.001 
CH Points: Category 4 0.024 0.008 0.003 0.064 0.024 0.008 0.019 0.011 0.090 0.050 0.018 0.006 
CH Points: Category 5 0.033 0.011 0.003 -0.029 0.046 0.526 0.013 0.017 0.439 0.033 0.029 0.263 
CH Points: Category 6 0.108 0.009 <0.001 0.124 0.023 <0.001 0.102 0.010 <0.001 0.113 0.012 <0.001 
Circuit: DC 0.077 0.071 0.278 -0.489 0.104 <0.001 0.010 0.072 0.886 -1.455 0.093 <0.001 
Circuit: 1 0.089 0.062 0.151 0.038 0.111 0.731 0.240 0.068 <0.001 -0.212 0.108 0.050 
Circuit: 2 -0.088 0.037 0.018 -0.757 0.072 <0.001 -0.166 0.047 <0.001 -0.974 0.088 <0.001 
Circuit: 3 0.149 0.035 <0.001 -0.184 0.065 0.005 0.204 0.046 <0.001 -0.359 0.065 <0.001 
Circuit: 4 0.357 0.038 <0.001 0.212 0.064 0.001 0.505 0.043 <0.001 0.204 0.064 0.001 
Circuit: 5 0.407 0.037 <0.001 0.349 0.061 <0.001 0.524 0.039 <0.001 0.436 0.059 <0.001 
Circuit: 6 0.147 0.036 <0.001 0.243 0.061 <0.001 0.380 0.044 <0.001 0.274 0.067 <0.001 
Circuit: 7 0.182 0.042 <0.001 0.243 0.073 0.001 0.344 0.064 <0.001 0.434 0.063 <0.001 
Circuit: 8 0.132 0.040 0.001 -0.099 0.071 0.167 0.348 0.042 <0.001 0.008 0.072 0.907 
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No drugs, no substantial 
assistance 
No drugs, substantial 
assistance 
Drugs, no substantial 
assistance Drugs, substantial assistance 
Variable Est Std err p Est Std err p Est Std err p Est Std err p 
Circuit: 10 0.092 0.040 0.020 0.093 0.070 0.183 0.182 0.045 <0.001 0.025 0.062 0.687 
Circuit: 11 0.294 0.031 <0.001 0.398 0.055 <0.001 0.548 0.046 <0.001 0.497 0.056 <0.001 
Intercept -0.127 0.032 <0.001 -0.101 0.067 0.129 -0.320 0.044 <0.001 -0.259 0.057 <0.001 
Random effects             
Var (white) 0.075 0.006  0.141 0.014  0.131 0.012  0.210 0.015  
Var (black) 0.077 0.007  0.176 0.020  0.119 0.010  0.230 0.016  
Var (Hispanic) 0.020 0.008  0.067 0.047  0.026 0.009  0.013 0.010  
Var (other) 0.206 0.049  0.137 0.046  0.268 0.072  0.334 0.116  
Cov (white, black) 0.062 0.005     0.103 0.009  0.197 0.013  
Cov (white, Hispanic) -0.015 0.005     -0.044 0.008  -0.029 0.011  
Cov (white, other) 0.056 0.009     0.111 0.021  0.183 0.031  
Cov (black, Hispanic) -0.008 0.006     -0.026 0.007  -0.024 0.010  
Cov (black, other) 0.036 0.010     0.094 0.015  0.203 0.037  
Cov (Hispanic, other) -0.021 0.013     -0.035 0.017  -0.032 0.017  
Var (residual) 0.889 0.020  0.722 0.021  0.823 0.027  0.646 0.016  
             
obs 76405   10829   62650   25380   
groups 1292   1020   1181   1064   
ln L -105157   -14282   -84030   -31563   
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Figure B.1 – Changes over time for three guideline cells: Males 
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Figure B.2 – Predicted and actual sentences across maximum sentence in guideline cells: Males 
 
  
No drugs, no substantial assistance No drugs, substantial assistance 
  
Drugs, no substantial assistance Drugs, substantial assistance 
  
Note. Dashed line is a quadratic trend fit to the predicted difference. 
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Figure B.3 – Differences in judge distributions: Males 
No drugs, no substantial assistance No drugs, substantial assistance 
  
Drugs, no substantial assistance Drugs, substantial assistance 
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Data partition: Females, no weapons offenses, no sex offenders 
Table B.3 – Parameter estimates from mixed models: Females 
 
No drugs, no substantial 
assistance 
No drugs, substantial 
assistance 
Drugs, no substantial 
assistance Drugs, substantial assistance 
Variable Est Std err p Est Std err p Est Std err p Est Std err p 
Year x Pre-Gall -0.125 0.209 0.550 0.988 0.387 0.011 -0.061 0.236 0.795 0.344 0.234 0.141 
Year x Post-Gall -0.281 0.098 0.004 -0.343 0.184 0.063 -0.565 0.100 <0.001 -0.333 0.093 <0.001 
Race/Ethnicity: Non-Hispanic black -0.113 0.094 0.231 0.269 0.188 0.153 0.098 0.119 0.409 -0.065 0.119 0.585 
Race/Ethnicity: Hispanic -0.002 0.125 0.990 0.057 0.308 0.854 0.179 0.086 0.038 0.055 0.151 0.715 
Race/Ethnicity: Non-Hispanic other -0.010 0.173 0.952 -0.191 0.470 0.685 -0.092 0.179 0.605 0.049 0.188 0.795 
Black x Year x Pre-Gall 0.561 0.323 0.082 -0.854 0.616 0.166 -0.207 0.400 0.604 -0.305 0.404 0.450 
Hispanic x Year x Pre-Gall -0.149 0.380 0.695 -0.084 0.919 0.927 -0.218 0.277 0.431 -0.191 0.483 0.692 
Other x Year x Pre-Gall 0.292 0.592 0.622 1.158 1.942 0.551 0.809 0.516 0.117 -0.121 0.658 0.855 
Black x Year x Post-Gall 0.140 0.140 0.318 0.416 0.264 0.115 0.112 0.182 0.540 0.224 0.223 0.314 
Hispanic x Year x Post-Gall -0.001 0.153 0.996 0.109 0.294 0.711 0.105 0.130 0.419 0.298 0.178 0.095 
Other x Year x Post-Gall 0.264 0.264 0.316 -0.423 0.824 0.608 0.143 0.208 0.491 0.106 0.321 0.742 
Max Sentence in Guideline Cell -0.062 0.158 0.696 -0.144 0.270 0.594 -0.186 0.126 0.139 -0.313 0.128 0.014 
Black x Max Sentence -0.422 0.249 0.090 -0.267 0.472 0.572 0.022 0.195 0.910 0.309 0.237 0.192 
Hispanic x Max Sentence 0.661 0.368 0.072 0.029 0.678 0.966 -0.195 0.183 0.286 -0.003 0.222 0.989 
Other x Max Sentence 0.130 0.353 0.713 0.486 0.590 0.410 -0.596 0.321 0.064 0.282 0.315 0.371 
Sentence is a new conviction 0.111 0.043 0.009 0.458 1.019 0.654 0.254 0.059 <0.001 0.118 0.202 0.557 
CH Points: Category 1 0.040 0.022 0.063 0.074 0.038 0.052 0.061 0.013 <0.001 0.082 0.015 <0.001 
CH Points: Category 2 0.019 0.026 0.479 -0.019 0.049 0.701 0.087 0.025 0.001 0.036 0.033 0.269 
CH Points: Category 3 0.020 0.022 0.380 0.048 0.046 0.301 0.059 0.023 0.009 0.090 0.029 0.002 
CH Points: Category 4 0.107 0.043 0.014 -0.058 0.112 0.603 0.034 0.037 0.358 -0.044 0.063 0.486 
CH Points: Category 5 -0.016 0.058 0.787 0.006 0.158 0.970 -0.088 0.061 0.146 -0.051 0.085 0.550 
CH Points: Category 6 0.145 0.029 <0.001 0.090 0.070 0.198 0.153 0.037 <0.001 0.042 0.029 0.155 
Circuit: DC 0.402 0.103 <0.001 0.141 0.219 0.521 -0.656 0.191 0.001 -1.260 0.140 <0.001 
Circuit: 1 0.047 0.092 0.609 -0.201 0.179 0.259 0.160 0.123 0.194 -0.336 0.169 0.047 
Circuit: 2 -0.246 0.085 0.004 -0.564 0.107 <0.001 -0.647 0.087 <0.001 -0.925 0.102 <0.001 
Circuit: 3 0.138 0.067 0.039 -0.123 0.092 0.179 0.061 0.102 0.550 -0.555 0.101 <0.001 
Circuit: 4 0.425 0.056 <0.001 0.515 0.105 <0.001 0.466 0.056 <0.001 0.030 0.092 0.741 
Circuit: 5 0.412 0.051 <0.001 0.442 0.097 <0.001 0.531 0.060 <0.001 0.219 0.086 0.011 
Circuit: 6 0.148 0.058 0.011 0.134 0.097 0.167 0.365 0.085 <0.001 0.130 0.089 0.146 
Circuit: 7 0.081 0.072 0.266 0.419 0.134 0.002 0.156 0.120 0.193 0.138 0.113 0.222 
Circuit: 8 0.193 0.064 0.003 -0.003 0.117 0.983 0.298 0.071 <0.001 -0.161 0.099 0.105 
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No drugs, no substantial 
assistance 
No drugs, substantial 
assistance 
Drugs, no substantial 
assistance Drugs, substantial assistance 
Variable Est Std err p Est Std err p Est Std err p Est Std err p 
Circuit: 10 0.245 0.069 <0.001 0.081 0.130 0.532 0.111 0.083 0.182 -0.186 0.095 0.051 
Circuit: 11 0.422 0.055 <0.001 0.393 0.093 <0.001 0.371 0.067 <0.001 0.257 0.082 0.002 
Intercept -0.166 0.073 0.023 -0.435 0.127 0.001 -0.171 0.083 0.039 0.014 0.096 0.887 
             
Random effects             
Var (white) 0.128 0.018  0.145 0.035  0.147 0.020  0.238 0.023  
Var (black) 0.091 0.021  0.164 0.041  0.285 0.042  0.220 0.037  
Var (Hispanic) 0.060 0.038  0.028 0.052  0.000 0.000  0.052 0.024  
Var (other) 0.195 0.063  0.293 0.170  0.303 0.109  0.303 0.087  
Cov (white, black) 0.063 0.013           
Cov (white, Hispanic) -0.059 0.024           
Cov (white, other) 0.054 0.031           
Cov (black, Hispanic) -0.013 0.021           
Cov (black, other) 0.001 0.046           
Cov (Hispanic, other) 0.005 0.049           
             
Var (residual) 0.824 0.040  0.688 0.034  0.704 0.030  0.612 0.021  
             
obs 9001   2124   9501   5737   
groups 1031   709   931   863   
ln L -12307   -2810   -12393   -7277   
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Figure B.4 – Changes over time for three guideline cells: Females 
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Figure B.5 – Predicted and actual sentences across maximum sentence in guideline cells: Females 
No drugs, no substantial assistance No drugs, substantial assistance 
  
Drugs, No Substantial Assistance Drugs, Substantial Assistance 
  
Note. Dashed line is a quadratic trend fit to the predicted difference. 
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Figure B.6 – Differences in judge distributions: Females 
No drugs, no substantial assistance No drugs, substantial assistance 
  
Drugs, no substantial assistance Drugs, substantial assistance 
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Data partition: Weapons offenders, no sex offenders 
Table B.4 – Parameter estimates from mixed models: Weapons offenders 
 
No drugs, no substantial 
assistance 
No drugs, substantial 
assistance 
Drugs, no substantial 
assistance Drugs, substantial assistance 
Variable Est Std err p Est Std err p Est Std err p Est Std err P 
Year x Pre-Gall -0.460 0.222 0.039 -0.733 0.420 0.081 -0.640 0.202 0.002 -0.176 0.267 0.509 
Year x Post-Gall -0.013 0.089 0.879 -0.013 0.195 0.949 -0.509 0.083 <0.001 -0.191 0.106 0.072 
Race/Ethnicity: Non-Hispanic black 0.022 0.082 0.790 0.021 0.177 0.908 -0.035 0.084 0.676 0.118 0.113 0.296 
Race/Ethnicity: Hispanic 0.209 0.135 0.121 -0.004 0.233 0.986 0.014 0.112 0.900 0.346 0.161 0.032 
Race/Ethnicity: Non-Hispanic other -0.425 0.093 <0.001 0.133 0.409 0.745 -0.400 0.168 0.017 0.106 0.208 0.611 
Black x Year x Pre-Gall 0.741 0.262 0.005 0.632 0.522 0.226 0.578 0.246 0.019 0.116 0.326 0.722 
Hispanic x Year x Pre-Gall -0.231 0.394 0.558 0.525 0.688 0.445 -0.021 0.324 0.948 -0.697 0.473 0.140 
Other x Year x Pre-Gall 0.433 0.298 0.146 -1.291 1.263 0.307 1.166 0.592 0.049 -0.451 0.631 0.475 
Black x Year x Post-Gall 0.033 0.111 0.767 -0.048 0.228 0.833 -0.028 0.102 0.782 -0.023 0.141 0.869 
Hispanic x Year x Post-Gall -0.015 0.129 0.906 -0.320 0.315 0.310 0.230 0.118 0.052 0.044 0.166 0.793 
Other x Year x Post-Gall -0.033 0.134 0.805 0.616 0.498 0.216 -0.036 0.369 0.922 0.238 0.366 0.516 
Max Sentence in Guideline Cell -0.289 0.076 <0.001 0.581 0.174 0.001 -0.213 0.084 0.011 0.098 0.098 0.316 
Black x Max Sentence -0.317 0.083 <0.001 -0.456 0.200 0.022 -0.126 0.094 0.181 -0.189 0.120 0.115 
Hispanic x Max Sentence -0.200 0.122 0.100 -0.380 0.246 0.122 -0.019 0.112 0.866 -0.202 0.153 0.186 
Other x Max Sentence 0.533 0.140 <0.001 0.662 0.499 0.184 0.060 0.234 0.798 -0.012 0.280 0.967 
Sentence is a new conviction 0.751 0.038 <0.001 0.530 0.312 0.089 0.425 0.032 <0.001 0.203 0.233 0.383 
CH Points: Category 1 0.004 0.013 0.769 0.024 0.018 0.172 0.037 0.013 0.004 0.025 0.017 0.127 
CH Points: Category 2 0.024 0.019 0.218 -0.028 0.040 0.491 0.042 0.025 0.089 0.009 0.014 0.521 
CH Points: Category 3 0.018 0.017 0.306 0.027 0.039 0.487 0.048 0.018 0.007 0.014 0.024 0.568 
CH Points: Category 4 -0.047 0.017 0.007 0.015 0.040 0.704 0.021 0.025 0.394 -0.007 0.039 0.851 
CH Points: Category 5 -0.051 0.030 0.093 -0.139 0.087 0.111 -0.006 0.033 0.862 0.018 0.018 0.329 
CH Points: Category 6 0.012 0.017 0.480 0.077 0.033 0.021 0.109 0.018 <0.001 0.064 0.023 0.006 
Circuit: DC -0.210 0.133 0.115 -0.563 0.170 0.001 -0.252 0.097 0.009 -1.464 0.113 <0.001 
Circuit: 1 0.085 0.080 0.289 0.202 0.109 0.064 0.188 0.065 0.004 -0.156 0.147 0.288 
Circuit: 2 -0.186 0.051 <0.001 -0.498 0.085 <0.001 -0.045 0.072 0.535 -1.022 0.114 <0.001 
Circuit: 3 0.167 0.056 0.003 0.025 0.087 0.777 0.116 0.074 0.119 -0.193 0.100 0.052 
Circuit: 4 0.370 0.048 <0.001 0.417 0.091 <0.001 0.420 0.052 <0.001 0.302 0.090 0.001 
Circuit: 5 0.135 0.048 0.005 0.320 0.086 <0.001 0.425 0.060 <0.001 0.327 0.086 <0.001 
Circuit: 6 0.246 0.045 <0.001 0.494 0.080 <0.001 0.246 0.059 <0.001 0.234 0.092 0.011 
Circuit: 7 0.164 0.053 0.002 0.389 0.102 <0.001 0.269 0.074 <0.001 0.345 0.094 <0.001 
Circuit: 8 0.053 0.043 0.219 0.082 0.086 0.336 0.209 0.054 <0.001 0.100 0.102 0.326 
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No drugs, no substantial 
assistance 
No drugs, substantial 
assistance 
Drugs, no substantial 
assistance Drugs, substantial assistance 
Variable Est Std err p Est Std err p Est Std err p Est Std err P 
Circuit: 10 0.043 0.045 0.347 0.007 0.096 0.939 0.108 0.060 0.071 -0.077 0.093 0.404 
Circuit: 11 0.361 0.051 <0.001 0.648 0.090 <0.001 0.511 0.060 <0.001 0.438 0.092 <0.001 
Intercept -0.121 0.078 0.119 -0.207 0.152 0.173 -0.015 0.078 0.849 -0.102 0.113 0.369 
             
Random effects             
Var (white) 0.043 0.009  0.063 0.030  0.081 0.013  0.164 0.021  
Var (black) 0.073 0.010  0.158 0.029  0.149 0.022  0.205 0.028  
Var (Hispanic) 0.044 0.031  0.004 0.070  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  
Var (other) 0.001 0.006  0.035 0.072  0.075 0.059  0.187 0.083  
Cov (white, black)             
Cov (white, Hispanic)             
Cov (white, other)             
Cov (black, Hispanic)             
Cov (black, other)             
Cov (Hispanic, other)             
             
Var (residual) 0.677 0.023  0.724 0.035  0.809 0.026  0.633 0.020  
             
obs 15035   3462   14500   6771   
groups 1039   749   1026   878   
ln L -19937   -4285   -19604   -8578   
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Figure B.7 –  Changes over time for three guideline cells: Weapons offenders  
No drugs, no substantial assistance No drugs, substantial assistance 
  
Drugs, no substantial assistance Drugs, substantial assistance 
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Figure B.8 – Predicted and actual sentences across maximum sentence in guideline cells: Weapons offenders 
  
No drugs, no substantial assistance No drugs, substantial assistance 
  
Drugs, no substantial assistance Drugs, substantial assistance 
  
Note. Dashed line is a quadratic trend fit to the predicted difference. 
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Figure B.9 – Differences in judge distributions: Weapons offenders 
No drugs, no substantial assistance No drugs, substantial assistance 
  
Drugs, no substantial assistance Drugs, substantial assistance 
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Data partition: Sex offenders 
Table B.5 – Parameter estimates from mixed models: Sex offenders 
 No substantial assistance Substantial assistance 
Variable Est Std err p Est Std err p 
Year x Pre-Gall -0.404 0.147 0.006 -0.362 0.720 0.615 
Year x Post-Gall -0.658 0.055 <0.001 0.020 0.270 0.942 
Race/Ethnicity: Non-Hispanic black 0.616 0.385 0.110 2.751 0.638 <0.001 
Race/Ethnicity: Hispanic 0.076 0.242 0.753 0.427 0.774 0.581 
Race/Ethnicity: Non-Hispanic other 0.050 0.118 0.672 1.197 0.785 0.127 
Black x Year x Pre-Gall -1.955 1.136 0.085 -9.122 2.351 <0.001 
Hispanic x Year x Pre-Gall -0.574 0.737 0.436 0.039 2.388 0.987 
Other x Year x Pre-Gall -0.541 0.403 0.180 -5.341 2.159 0.013 
Black x Year x Post-Gall 0.238 0.227 0.294 1.144 0.699 0.102 
Hispanic x Year x Post-Gall 0.172 0.196 0.381 -1.071 0.963 0.266 
Other x Year x Post-Gall 0.519 0.184 0.005 3.116 1.547 0.044 
Max Sentence in Guidelines Cell -0.043 0.047 0.367 0.001 0.198 0.997 
Black x Max Sentence -0.082 0.158 0.601 -0.044 0.604 0.941 
Hispanic x Max Sentence 0.088 0.173 0.612 -0.527 0.724 0.467 
Other x Max Sentence -0.235 0.127 0.065 -1.079 0.975 0.269 
Sentence is a new conviction 0.303 0.039 <0.001    
CH Points: Category 1 0.079 0.012 <0.001 0.053 0.033 0.106 
CH Points: Category 2 0.060 0.037 0.108 0.160 0.140 0.253 
CH Points: Category 3 0.132 0.034 <0.001 -0.093 0.177 0.599 
CH Points: Category 4 -0.002 0.053 0.970 0.197 0.166 0.237 
CH Points: Category 5 -0.029 0.013 0.028 0.014 0.050 0.776 
CH Points: Category 6 -0.052 0.081 0.521 -0.964 0.495 0.051 
Circuit: DC 0.002 0.085 0.982 -0.489 0.380 0.199 
Circuit: 1 0.149 0.089 0.093 0.448 0.581 0.440 
Circuit: 2 -0.156 0.062 0.012 -0.147 0.209 0.484 
Circuit: 3 0.076 0.054 0.162 -0.214 0.148 0.149 
Circuit: 4 0.307 0.056 <0.001 -0.045 0.162 0.778 
Circuit: 5 0.481 0.057 <0.001 0.316 0.316 0.318 
Circuit: 6 0.198 0.052 <0.001 0.004 0.146 0.979 
Circuit: 7 0.364 0.064 <0.001 0.367 0.137 0.007 
Circuit: 8 0.161 0.049 0.001 -0.030 0.172 0.863 
Circuit: 10 0.111 0.049 0.023 0.434 0.208 0.037 
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 No substantial assistance Substantial assistance 
Variable Est Std err p Est Std err p 
Circuit: 11 0.309 0.052 <0.001 -0.039 0.164 0.814 
Intercept 0.113 0.055 0.039 0.126 0.231 0.587 
       
Random effects       
Var (white) 0.090 0.008  0.105 0.077  
Var (black) 0.243 0.088  0.000 .  
Var (Hispanic) 0.118 0.091  0.268 0.377  
Var (other) 0.136 0.038  0.243 0.273  
Cov (white, black)       
Cov (white, Hispanic)       
Cov (white, other)       
Cov (black, Hispanic)       
Cov (black, other)       
Cov (Hispanic, other)       
       
Var (residual) 0.819 0.024  0.683 0.075  
       
obs 15011   504   
groups 1067   287   
ln L -20369   -652   
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Figure B.10 – Changes over time for three guideline cells: Sex offenders 
  
No substantial assistance Substantial assistance 
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Figure B.11 – Predicted and actual sentences across maximum sentence in guideline cells: Sex offenders 
No Substantial Assistance Substantial Assistance 
  
Note. Dashed line is a quadratic trend fit to the predicted difference. 
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Figure B.12 – Differences in judge distributions: Sex offenders 
No substantial assistance Substantial assistance 
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Appendix C: Detailed findings for sentencing disparity: Non-U.S. citizens 
Tables and figures appearing in this appendix are the counterparts to the tables and figures appearing in appendix B. The sentencing of 
noncitizens is discussed here. 
 
Table C.1 – Number of observations for each guideline cell - Citizens 
  Criminal history category 
Offense level I II III IV V VI 
1             
2             
3             
4             
5             
6           254 
7         5 12 
8         80 76 
9       26 9 12 
10     10,540 7,624 4,118 2,823 
11       42 40 54 
12     454 203 92 75 
13   2,400 3,508 2,756 1,835 2,154 
14   213 240 124 84 98 
15   754 555 231 95 86 
16   111 121 47 45 47 
17   2,116 2,856 1,494 652 426 
18 855 162 171 68 33 28 
19 3,487 271 257 116 48 30 
20 642 92 91 40 24 9 
21 6,734 6,922 11,625 7,826 4,428 3,891 
22 958 317 464 285 186 160 
23 4,584 726 641 196 110 48 
24 1,724 120 140 85 72 78 
25 2,447 517 345 112 45 39 
26 1,175 127 113 40 19 19 
27 4,771 288 243 68 26 19 
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  Criminal history category 
Offense level I II III IV V VI 
28 617 104 80 30 11 5 
29 3,192 524 419 110 44 126 
30 493 84 84 21 16 18 
31 2,231 459 367 105 36 149 
32 532 75 68 24 2 23 
33 2,432 269 235 55 26 23 
34 497 80 88 23 3 220 
35 1,216 235 182 51 19 65 
36 384 63 40 23 6   
37 533 96 66 19 4 54 
38 425 68 41 9 2 19 
39 312 38 42 3 3 7 
40 239 43 38 6 6 6 
41 116 31 17 3 3   
42 119 21 18 3 3 2 
43 259 49 38 18   46 
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Data partition: Males, no weapons offenses, no sex offenders 
Table C.2 – Parameter estimates from mixed models: Males 
 
No drugs, no substantial 
assistance 
No drugs, substantial 
assistance 
Drugs, no substantial 
assistance Drugs, substantial assistance 
Variable Est Std err p Est Std err p Est Std err p Est Std err p 
Year x Pre-Gall -0.180 0.257 0.483 -0.203 0.680 0.765 0.251 0.244 0.304 0.493 0.415 0.235 
Year x Post-Gall -0.285 0.124 0.021 0.138 0.256 0.589 -0.833 0.106 <0.001 -0.324 0.171 0.059 
Race/Ethnicity: Non-Hispanic black 0.109 0.113 0.335 -0.111 0.303 0.715 -0.057 0.083 0.493 0.032 0.105 0.765 
Race/Ethnicity: Hispanic -0.189 0.091 0.037 0.262 0.248 0.291 0.262 0.086 0.002 0.323 0.123 0.009 
Race/Ethnicity: Non-Hispanic other 0.051 0.222 0.819 -0.039 0.337 0.907 0.147 0.205 0.473 -0.050 0.206 0.808 
Black x Year x Pre-Gall 0.322 0.356 0.365 0.714 0.981 0.466 0.172 0.261 0.511 0.212 0.345 0.538 
Hispanic x Year x Pre-Gall 0.258 0.257 0.315 -0.072 0.764 0.925 -0.491 0.251 0.050 -0.296 0.410 0.470 
Other x Year x Pre-Gall -0.179 0.753 0.812 0.574 1.048 0.584 -0.621 0.629 0.323 0.163 0.689 0.813 
Black x Year x Post-Gall -0.522 0.167 0.002 -0.138 0.369 0.708 -0.058 0.144 0.687 -0.246 0.195 0.207 
Hispanic x Year x Post-Gall -0.025 0.128 0.847 -0.230 0.297 0.438 0.633 0.119 <0.001 0.193 0.175 0.269 
Other x Year x Post-Gall -0.159 0.312 0.610 -0.605 0.357 0.090 -0.020 0.311 0.949 -0.144 0.326 0.659 
Max Sentence in Guideline Cell -0.638 0.159 <0.001 0.731 0.397 0.065 -0.397 0.134 0.003 0.220 0.143 0.123 
Black x Max Sentence 0.284 0.263 0.280 0.155 0.491 0.753 0.314 0.153 0.040 -0.080 0.161 0.620 
Hispanic x Max Sentence 1.432 0.229 <0.001 -0.773 0.403 0.055 -0.167 0.134 0.211 -0.168 0.148 0.256 
Other x Max Sentence 0.738 0.339 0.030 0.161 0.619 0.795 -0.084 0.271 0.756 -0.521 0.377 0.167 
Sentence is a new conviction 0.229 0.045 <0.001 0.285 0.267 0.286 0.232 0.032 <0.001 0.122 0.155 0.433 
CH Points: Category 1 0.029 0.011 0.008 0.070 0.038 0.071 0.063 0.008 <0.001 0.011 0.014 0.421 
CH Points: Category 2 0.055 0.011 <0.001 0.041 0.065 0.525 0.033 0.022 0.141 0.010 0.028 0.721 
CH Points: Category 3 0.069 0.008 <0.001 -0.079 0.055 0.154 0.046 0.020 0.019 0.066 0.034 0.058 
CH Points: Category 4 0.061 0.009 <0.001 -0.067 0.079 0.393 0.051 0.035 0.151 0.070 0.083 0.397 
CH Points: Category 5 0.052 0.010 <0.001 -0.030 0.137 0.825 -0.006 0.029 0.826 0.049 0.162 0.763 
CH Points: Category 6 0.138 0.019 <0.001 0.047 0.128 0.715 0.014 0.038 0.708 -0.001 0.067 0.993 
Circuit: DC 0.520 0.119 <0.001 -0.461 0.188 0.014 -0.439 0.150 0.003 -1.328 0.138 <0.001 
Circuit: 1 0.285 0.100 0.004 -0.154 0.176 0.381 0.223 0.078 0.004 -0.130 0.141 0.357 
Circuit: 2 0.168 0.062 0.007 -0.797 0.097 <0.001 -0.175 0.060 0.004 -1.248 0.092 <0.001 
Circuit: 3 0.279 0.068 <0.001 -0.244 0.092 0.008 0.317 0.062 <0.001 -0.390 0.071 <0.001 
Circuit: 4 0.725 0.073 <0.001 0.316 0.111 0.005 0.573 0.054 <0.001 0.067 0.076 0.376 
Circuit: 5 0.892 0.054 <0.001 0.173 0.075 0.022 0.531 0.044 <0.001 0.227 0.065 <0.001 
Circuit: 6 0.542 0.067 <0.001 0.169 0.118 0.151 0.334 0.066 <0.001 0.096 0.070 0.170 
Circuit: 7 0.546 0.061 <0.001 0.206 0.152 0.174 0.356 0.059 <0.001 0.335 0.070 <0.001 
Circuit: 8 0.518 0.065 <0.001 -0.169 0.191 0.377 0.426 0.044 <0.001 0.004 0.093 0.964 
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No drugs, no substantial 
assistance 
No drugs, substantial 
assistance 
Drugs, no substantial 
assistance Drugs, substantial assistance 
Variable Est Std err p Est Std err p Est Std err p Est Std err p 
Circuit: 10 0.203 0.067 0.002 -0.076 0.106 0.476 0.218 0.055 <0.001 -0.008 0.080 0.919 
Circuit: 11 0.686 0.056 <0.001 0.317 0.075 <0.001 0.556 0.045 <0.001 0.332 0.057 <0.001 
Intercept -0.148 0.092 0.107 -0.078 0.223 0.726 -0.197 0.090 0.029 -0.222 0.131 0.089 
             
Random effects             
Var (white) 0.161 0.016  0.085 0.028  0.089 0.010  0.130 0.019  
Var (black) 0.444 0.098  0.123 0.112  0.134 0.033  0.274 0.077  
Var (Hispanic) 0.113 0.017  0.000 0.000  0.019 0.008  0.043 0.018  
Var (other) 0.651 0.195  0.185 0.089  0.523 0.129  0.336 0.077  
             
Var (residual) 0.726 0.033  0.714 0.038  0.739 0.034  0.513 0.019  
             
obs 87399   1918   29042   6609   
groups 1141   597   1062   893   
ln L -111812   -2510   -37639   -7761   
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Figure C.1 – Changes over time for three guideline cells: Males 
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Figure C.2 – Predicted and actual sentences across maximum sentence in guideline cells: Males 
No drugs, no substantial assistance No drugs, substantial assistance 
  
Drugs, no substantial assistance Drugs, substantial assistance 
  
Note. Dashed line is a quadratic trend fit to the predicted difference. 
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Figure C.3 – Differences in judge distributions: Males 
No drugs, no substantial assistance No drugs, substantial assistance 
  
Drugs, no substantial assistance Drugs, substantial assistance 
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Data partition: Females, no weapons offenses, no sex offenders 
Table C.3 – Parameter Estimates from mixed models: Females, no weapons offenses, no sex offenders 
 No drugs Drugs 
Variable Est Std err p Est Std err p 
Year x Pre-Gall -0.829 1.303 0.525 -1.170 0.716 0.102 
Year x Post-Gall -0.658 0.341 0.054 0.059 0.211 0.780 
Race/Ethnicity: Non-Hispanic black -0.039 0.512 0.939 -0.265 0.272 0.330 
Race/Ethnicity: Hispanic -0.154 0.462 0.739 0.291 0.260 0.262 
Race/Ethnicity: Non-Hispanic other -0.350 0.674 0.604 -0.735 0.353 0.037 
Black x Year x Pre-Gall 0.002 1.649 0.999 1.386 0.865 0.109 
Hispanic x Year x Pre-Gall 0.671 1.331 0.614 0.328 0.762 0.667 
Other x Year x Pre-Gall 1.441 2.060 0.484 2.624 1.049 0.012 
Black x Year x Post-Gall 0.523 0.604 0.386 -0.472 0.337 0.162 
Hispanic x Year x Post-Gall 0.275 0.353 0.436 -0.321 0.241 0.183 
Other x Year x Post-Gall 0.618 0.552 0.264 -1.400 0.482 0.004 
Max Sentence in Guideline Cell 0.452 0.699 0.517 0.392 0.539 0.467 
Black x Max Sentence 0.553 0.975 0.571 0.522 0.634 0.410 
Hispanic x Max Sentence -0.683 0.770 0.375 -0.663 0.554 0.231 
Other x Max Sentence -2.502 1.440 0.082 0.305 0.714 0.669 
Sentence is a new conviction 0.428 0.105 <0.001 0.438 0.085 <0.001 
CH Points: Category 1 0.034 0.046 0.462 0.031 0.036 0.397 
CH Points: Category 2 0.028 0.052 0.584 0.033 0.096 0.733 
CH Points: Category 3 0.104 0.034 0.002 0.029 0.103 0.779 
CH Points: Category 4 0.071 0.063 0.259 0.587 0.220 0.008 
CH Points: Category 5 0.060 0.074 0.417 0.345 0.715 0.629 
CH Points: Category 6 0.152 0.105 0.149 0.080 0.147 0.588 
Circuit: DC 0.131 0.312 0.674 -1.088 0.208 <0.001 
Circuit: 1 0.105 0.167 0.530 -0.008 0.212 0.971 
Circuit: 2 -0.306 0.093 0.001 -0.654 0.084 <0.001 
Circuit: 3 0.095 0.143 0.505 -0.313 0.115 0.006 
Circuit: 4 0.426 0.113 <0.001 0.384 0.126 0.002 
Circuit: 5 0.541 0.090 <0.001 0.632 0.075 <0.001 
Circuit: 6 0.188 0.212 0.375 -0.126 0.144 0.382 
Circuit: 7 0.278 0.146 0.056 0.124 0.100 0.215 
Circuit: 8 0.114 0.184 0.536 0.378 0.118 0.001 
Circuit: 10 0.108 0.121 0.370 0.105 0.110 0.339 
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Circuit: 11 0.524 0.079 <0.001 0.553 0.081 <0.001 
Intercept 0.096 0.454 0.833 -0.032 0.254 0.901 
       
Random effects       
Var (white) 0.118 0.057  0.051 0.034  
Var (black) 0.570 0.188  0.224 0.061  
Var (Hispanic) 0.064 0.054  0.078 0.044  
Var (other) 0.325 0.143  0.296 0.120  
       
Var (residual) 0.704 0.037  0.620 0.037  
       
obs 2847   2833   
groups 593   615   
ln L -3759   -3531   
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Figure C.4 – Changes over time for three guideline cells: Females 
 
 
Figure C.5 – Predicted and actual sentences across maximum sentence in guideline cells: Females 
No drugs Drugs 
  
Note. Dashed line is a quadratic trend fit to the predicted difference. 
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Figure C.6 – Differences in judge distributions: Females 
No drugs Drugs 
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Data partition: Weapons offenders, no sex offenders 
Table C.4 – Parameter estimates from mixed models: Weapons offenders 
 No drugs Drugs 
Variable Est Std err p Est Std err p 
Year x Pre-Gall 0.987 0.897 0.271 -2.801 1.116 0.012 
Year x Post-Gall -0.220 0.367 0.550 0.440 0.298 0.140 
Race/Ethnicity: Non-Hispanic black 0.493 0.362 0.173 -0.071 0.368 0.847 
Race/Ethnicity: Hispanic 0.521 0.290 0.072 -0.551 0.412 0.181 
Race/Ethnicity: Non-Hispanic other 0.671 0.544 0.218 -1.503 0.514 0.003 
Black x Year x Pre-Gall -0.212 1.147 0.854 0.861 0.953 0.366 
Hispanic x Year x Pre-Gall -1.281 0.918 0.163 2.264 1.104 0.040 
Other x Year x Pre-Gall -2.101 1.569 0.181 4.105 1.376 0.003 
Black x Year x Post-Gall -0.549 0.405 0.176 -0.663 0.318 0.037 
Hispanic x Year x Post-Gall 0.308 0.361 0.393 -0.650 0.299 0.030 
Other x Year x Post-Gall -0.074 0.503 0.882 -0.884 0.453 0.051 
Max Sentence in Guidelines Cell 0.126 0.235 0.591 0.050 0.277 0.858 
Black x Max Sentence -0.364 0.257 0.158 -0.242 0.278 0.384 
Hispanic x Max Sentence -0.429 0.230 0.062 -0.172 0.271 0.526 
Other x Max Sentence -0.160 0.358 0.654 0.454 0.377 0.229 
Sentence is a new conviction 0.572 0.078 <0.001 0.441 0.063 <0.001 
CH Points: Category 1 0.049 0.031 0.118 0.055 0.020 0.007 
CH Points: Category 2 -0.039 0.071 0.582 0.087 0.043 0.043 
CH Points: Category 3 0.086 0.050 0.083 -0.025 0.039 0.522 
CH Points: Category 4 -0.011 0.060 0.857 0.078 0.084 0.351 
CH Points: Category 5 0.012 0.047 0.805 0.026 0.087 0.760 
CH Points: Category 6 0.063 0.063 0.316 0.010 0.074 0.888 
Circuit: DC -0.078 0.152 0.606 -0.103 0.181 0.570 
Circuit: 1 0.563 0.151 <0.001 0.085 0.160 0.596 
Circuit: 2 -0.185 0.084 0.028 -0.812 0.101 <0.001 
Circuit: 3 0.319 0.127 0.012 -0.237 0.130 0.067 
Circuit: 4 0.515 0.100 <0.001 0.393 0.072 <0.001 
Circuit: 5 0.096 0.099 0.331 0.203 0.066 0.002 
Circuit: 6 0.115 0.136 0.399 0.050 0.098 0.607 
Circuit: 7 0.165 0.124 0.183 0.214 0.092 0.020 
Circuit: 8 0.008 0.151 0.956 0.218 0.064 0.001 
Circuit: 10 0.140 0.124 0.259 0.012 0.073 0.867 
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 No drugs Drugs 
Variable Est Std err p Est Std err p 
Circuit: 11 0.567 0.103 <0.001 0.412 0.071 <0.001 
Intercept -0.565 0.282 0.045 0.682 0.418 0.103 
       
Random effects       
Var (white) 0.139 0.039  0.099   
Var (black) 0.112 0.084  0.167   
Var (Hispanic) 0.055 0.041  0.000   
Var (other) 0.036 0.088  0.000   
       
Var (residual) 0.646 0.043  0.756   
       
Obs 2256   4408   
Groups 564   749   
ln L -2886   -5831   
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Figure C.7 –  Changes over time for three guideline cells: Weapons offenders 
 
Figure C.8 – Predicted and actual sentences across maximum sentence in guideline cells: Weapons offenders 
No drugs Drugs 
  
Note. Dashed line is a quadratic trend fit to the predicted difference. 
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Figure C.9 – Differences in judge distributions: Weapons offenders 
No drugs Drugs 
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Data partition: Sex offenders 
Table C.6 – Parameter estimates from mixed models: Sex offenders 
Variable Est Std err p 
Year x Pre-Gall -1.171 0.921 0.203 
Year x Post-Gall 0.017 0.390 0.965 
Race/Ethnicity: Non-Hispanic black 0.219 0.844 0.795 
Race/Ethnicity: Hispanic -0.117 0.540 0.829 
Race/Ethnicity: Non-Hispanic other -0.940 0.603 0.119 
Black x Year x Pre-Gall -1.958 2.657 0.461 
Hispanic x Year x Pre-Gall 0.887 1.717 0.605 
Other x Year x Pre-Gall 2.846 1.943 0.143 
Black x Year x Post-Gall -0.057 0.734 0.938 
Hispanic x Year x Post-Gall -0.400 0.468 0.392 
Other x Year x Post-Gall -0.823 0.761 0.279 
Max Sentence in Guidelines Cell -0.156 0.332 0.637 
Black x Max Sentence 0.374 0.893 0.675 
Hispanic x Max Sentence 0.220 0.440 0.616 
Other x Max Sentence 0.103 0.472 0.827 
Sentence is a new conviction 0.145 0.150 0.333 
CH Points: Category 1 0.128 0.088 0.146 
CH Points: Category 2 -0.210 0.172 0.222 
CH Points: Category 3 -0.181 0.270 0.504 
CH Points: Category 4 n/a n/a n/a 
CH Points: Category 5 n/a n/a n/a 
CH Points: Category 6 n/a n/a n/a 
Circuit: DC -0.554 0.223 0.013 
Circuit: 1 -0.167 0.385 0.665 
Circuit: 2 -0.129 0.188 0.491 
Circuit: 3 -0.041 0.196 0.835 
Circuit: 4 0.327 0.164 0.045 
Circuit: 5 0.145 0.177 0.412 
Circuit: 6 0.210 0.177 0.234 
Circuit: 7 0.628 0.340 0.065 
Circuit: 8 0.171 0.154 0.267 
Circuit: 10 -0.049 0.298 0.869 
Circuit: 11 0.195 0.134 0.145 
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Variable Est Std err p 
Intercept 0.356 0.263 0.177 
    
Random effects    
Var (white) 0.109 0.101  
Var (black) n/a n/a  
Var (Hispanic) 0.127 0.136  
Var (other) 0.519 0.282  
    
Var (residual) 0.637 0.106  
    
obs 541   
groups 327   
ln L -721   
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Figure C.10 – Changes over time for three guideline cells: Sex offenders 
 
Figure C.11 – Predicted and actual sentences across maximum sentence in guideline cells: Sex offenders 
 
Note. Dashed line is a quadratic trend fit to the predicted difference. 
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Figure C.12 – Differences in judge distributions: Sex offenders 
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Appendix D: Detailed findings for prosecutorial discretion 
This appendix presents tables and figures pertaining to prosecutorial discretion. 
 
Figure D.1 – Cocaine: 500g Threshold 
 
Figure D.2 – Cocaine: 5000g Threshold 
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Figure D.3 – Crack, Pre-2010: 5g Threshold 
 
Figure D.4 – Crack, Pre-2010: 50g Threshold 
 
  
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
2 3 4 5 6 7 8Pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 o
ffe
nd
er
s (
+/
-) 
3 
gm
s.
 
of
 th
e 
th
re
sh
ol
d 
Grams of Crack
Whites Blacks Hispanics
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56 58 60
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 o
ffe
nd
er
s (
+/
-) 
10
 g
m
s.
 
of
 th
e 
th
re
sh
ol
d 
Grams of Crack
Whites Blacks Hispanics
 Federal Sentencing Disparity, 2005–2012   120 
Figure D.5 – Crack, Post-2010: 28g Threshold 
 
Figure D.6 – Crack, Post-2010: 280g Threshold 
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Figure D.7 – Heroin: 100g Threshold 
 
Figure D.8 – Heroin: 1000g Threshold 
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Figure D.9 – Marijuana: 100,000g Threshold 
 
Figure D.10 – Marijuana: 1,000,000g Threshold 
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Figure D.11 – Methamphetamine (Mixture): 50g Threshold 
 
Figure D.12 – Methamphetamine (Mixture): 500g Threshold 
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Figure D.13 – Methamphetamine (Pure): 5g Threshold 
 
Figure D.14 – Methamphetamine (Pure): 50g Threshold 
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Table D.1 – Boundaries chosen around drug threshold amounts based on graphical inspection 
*For cocaine: lower cutoff (500) = +/- 20 g; upper cutoff (5,000) = +/- 100 g 
*For crack (pre 2010): lower cutoff (5) = +/- 1 g; upper cutoff (50) = +/- 5 g 
*For crack (post 2010): lower cutoff (28) = +/- 4 g; upper cutoff (280) = +/- 40 g 
*For heroin: lower cutoff (100) = +/- 10 g; upper cutoff (1,000) = +/- 50 g 
*For marijuana: lower cutoff (100,000) = +/- 4,000 g; upper cutoff (1,000,000) = +/-40,000 g 
*For meth (mix): lower cutoff (50) = +/- 5 g; upper cutoff (500) = +/- 20 g 
*For meth (pure): lower cutoff (5) = +/- 1 g; upper cutoff (50) = +/- 5 g 
 
Table D.2 – Percent missing weights, by race and drug 
  Any Cocaine Crack Heroin Marijuana Meth (mix) Meth (pure) 
White 28.7% 26.6% 23.8% 39.4% 18.4% 34.7% 16.6% 
Black 23.1% 22.1% 17.6% 35.6% 12.8% 22.9% 8.0% 
Hispanic 24.8% 32.2% 35.8% 35.3% 9.1% 24.6% 8.0% 
Overall 25.1% 25.9% 19.5% 36.1% 13.1% 32.4% 13.7% 
 
Table D.3 – For range check estimation: Conditional differences (males and females) 
 
White Black Hispanic White Black Hispanic 
Lower Upper 
Cocaine - -8.1 *** -5.4  - 5.2  -8.0 *** 
Crack - 3.2  -0.5  - 3.6  -18.4 *** 
Heroin - -1.6  -11.1 ** - -0.6  -3.0  
Marijuana - 2.1  -4.4  - 15.7 *** 13.7 *** 
Meth (mix) - 3.3  5.3  - -20.0 *** 6.1  
Meth (pure) - 9.8  -10.7  - 8.9  1.3  
Notes. **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
 
Table D.4 – For logistic estimation: Conditional differences (males and females) 
Differences in probability of being above the cutoff, relative to whites 
 
White Black Hispanic White Black Hispanic 
Lower Upper 
Cocaine - 13.6 ** -21.2  - 6.0 ** -9.2 ** 
Crack - 5.3 ** 6.7  - -5.2 ** -1.0  
Heroin - -9.9  -12.6  - -1.2  -8.1  
Marijuana - 44.4  -1.3  - 5.4  -14.9  
Meth (mix) - 6.1  -7.4  - <0.00  -0.3  
Meth (pure) - -33.0  -3.6  - -6.5  -14.5  
Notes. **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table D.5 – For male versus female estimation: Conditional differences (males only) 
Differences in probability of being above the cutoff, relative to whites 
 
White Black Hispanic White Black Hispanic 
Lower Upper 
Cocaine - -10.3 ** -17.6 *** - 7.8 ** -12.1 *** 
Crack - 7.2  9.9  - -4.5  0.8  
Heroin - -13.6 *** -19.8 ** - 3.5  -4.4  
Marijuana - 29.5  -3.0  - 4.3  -12.4  
Meth (mix) - -3.3  -5.3  - 18.8  3.3  
Meth (pure) - -27.4  -7.0  - -2.5  -10.3  
Notes. **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
Table D.6 – For Male versus female estimation: Conditional differences (females only) 
Differences in probability of being above the cutoff, relative to whites 
 
White Black Hispanic White Black Hispanic 
Lower Upper 
Cocaine - -21.5  -21.7  - -18.8  -26.6  
Crack - 5.8  -28.3  - -6.4  -19.9  
Heroin - -6.1  12.3  - -53.8  36.5  
Marijuana - 63.7  -3.4  - <0.00  <0.00  
Meth (mix) - 150.9 ** -28.0  - <0.00  -48.3  
Meth (pure) - <0.00  7.6  - -88.6  -59.1 *** 
Notes. **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
